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Preface
The 2020 edition of the Annual Review of Constitution-Building marks the end of 
a decade that has been critical for democracy and for International IDEA. As the 
global democracy landscape faces increasing challenges related to backsliding and 
institutional fragility, International IDEA has stepped up its efforts to strengthen 
and advance democracy around the world, with constitution-building as a key 
pillar of our work. Notably, the publication of this Annual Review also marks the 
25th anniversary of International IDEA, a year of celebration but also reflection 
about the past, present and future of democracy.
Constitutions are crucial to democracy and good governance, peacebuilding 
and conflict transformation, state building and rule of law, human rights and 
accountability. Understanding these relationships and trends, developing relevant 
knowledge resources and using them to assist ongoing transformation processes is 
an important element of our work to support democracy and development.
Since its launch in 2013, the Annual Review has become one of the leading 
resources among professionals and practitioners in the global constitution- 
building community. At a time when the need for shared knowledge and 
comparative experiences is stronger than ever before, International IDEA is 
pleased to contribute its knowledge and resources to global discussions on 
constitution-building processes and constitutional design.
International IDEA is privileged to work alongside national stakeholders and 
international partners in many of the countries discussed in this edition. We are 
proud to have been part of inclusive processes that can contribute to the stability 
of political settlements, sustainable peace and democratic resilience. The examples 
and insights shared in this edition show the strength of International IDEA as 
both a producer of global comparative knowledge and a provider of technical 
assistance with on-the-ground, direct experience.
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Preface
Our expertise—along with our network of international constitution-building 
and peacebuilding advisors, practitioners and scholars—enables us to reflect on 
trends, developments and changes in constitution-building processes and 
constitutional design choices around the world. We emphasize the importance of 
national ownership and of adapting—not adopting—comparative practice to the 
specific national context, and of providing options—not solutions—based on 
comparative practice.
In addition to covering the latest developments in constitution-building trends 
around the world, this year’s edition of the Annual Review includes a discussion 
with some of our international partners and colleagues. They reflect on a decade 
of constitution-building processes with the aim of providing useful insights for 





Annual Review of Constitution-Building: 2019
Introduction
Erin C. Houlihan
Each year, International IDEA’s Annual Review of Constitution-Building addresses 
events and developments in constitution-building processes and constitutional 
transitions around the world in the past year. This seventh edition, covering 
developments in 2019, marks the end of a decade. As with previous years, the 
chapters discuss a range of issues related to both process and design 
considerations. All chapters take a comparative perspective.
The chapters are connected, broadly speaking, to challenges and developments 
in managing participation and elite consensus-building in constitutional reform 
processes, and in negotiating the distribution and exercise of power in 
transitioning and post-conflict states. Key issues relate to challenges in sustaining 
constitutional pacts, structuring territorial power and autonomy, and designing 
ways to engage the public.
Because 2019 marks the close of a decade, International IDEA engaged in a 
series of discussions with international experts and scholars to identify key 
insights and reflections on the evolution of constitution-building over the past 10 
years. Chapter 1 summarizes the key takeaways from these discussions. The 
commentary highlights notable trends, identifies recurring issues and key 
innovations, examines the shifting role of the international community, and 
ponders some successes and challenges in constitution-building as a means of 
promoting peace and democracy.
Chapters 2 and 3 consider developments in 2019 from the perspective of two 
distinct yet related notions, or aspects, of constitutions and constitution-building 
processes, which are sometimes in tension with one another—constitutions as the 
result of pacts between elites, and constitutions as an expression of the shared 
vision and values of ‘the  people’  as determined through robust public 
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participation processes. In Chapter 2, Adem Abebe looks at challenges with 
sustaining constitutional pacts, and considers design mechanisms to protect 
against backsliding when power balances change. To ensure that these pacts are 
secure, constitutions often include guarantee mechanisms, most commonly in the 
form of stringent amendment procedures. Abebe examines the cases of Guinea 
and Zimbabwe and considers the efficacy of such mechanisms in safeguarding 
particular constitutional pacts during 2019. His analysis highlights that, while 
rigid amendment formulas may provide sufficient protection in states with 
effective democratic competition, alternative safeguards may be necessary in 
transitional contexts. Abebe suggests requiring that amendment of key provisions 
be rooted in a further pact; meaning that amendment formulas should 
complement common reliance on supermajoritarian thresholds or unamendable 
provisions with additional requirements for some degree of opposition agreement.
In Chapter 3, I examine one of the most notable trends in recent years—the 
increased involvement of the public in constitutional reform—with a focus on 
The Gambia and Mongolia. The chapter first surveys developments in 
scholarship and practice in participatory constitution-building. I then consider 
the different ways in which process designers in both countries approached public 
participation, and whether and how public feedback influenced elite decision- 
making in later stages. Both The Gambia and Mongolia embraced participation 
as a centrepiece of their constitutional reform projects, and both recognized 
citizen engagement as a normative good as well as a substantive and instrumental 
tool that could be used to shape the bargaining agenda and foster legitimacy. The 
chapter sheds light on some of the ways in which public participation can 
influence the political dynamics of constitution-making, as well as some of the 
limitations of that influence on desired outcomes.
In Chapter 4, W. Elliot Bulmer considers how constitutions change by 
examining innovative choices in the design of governance arrangements made by 
two regional jurisdictions undergoing transitions to greater autonomy. In both 
Tobago and the Autonomous Region of Bangsamoro, negotiations between the 
regions and their central governments have long centred not only on issues of 
autonomy, but also on the more complex issue of how power will be exercised 
within the regional units. While the political systems in federal or devolved 
countries often broadly replicate the system of the ‘parent’ state, both Tobago and 
Bangsamoro, rather than being tied to historical precedence, have taken more 
novel approaches. Tobago has sought to reform the familiar system by using a 
method for constructing the second chamber of parliament that differs from that 
of the central government, while retaining the underlying logic of the principle of 
representation. Bangsamoro has in comparison, sought to reject the presidential 
system familiar to the Philippines and to instead introduce a quasi-parliamentary 
system of government.
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Chapters 5 and 6 both focus on the complexities of federal systems and the 
challenges of negotiating and renegotiating federal state structures. In Chapter 5, 
Thibaut Noel considers federalization processes in Myanmar and South Sudan— 
two countries in which the structure of the state is highly contested, and 
commitments to federalization are central to complex and long-term peace 
processes. Noel reviews the history and trajectory of negotiations on federalization 
in both states and compares the ways in which demands related to shared rule, 
self-rule and boundary delineation have been prioritized and addressed. He then 
considers developments and setbacks in 2019 toward reaching agreements on key 
issues and challenges that likely lie ahead within each process. Noel’s examination 
highlights the fact that, though parties to a conflict may broadly agree on the 
need for federalization during the early stages of the political settlement process, 
the process of building consensus on the details of a federal system and 
concretizing commitments remains a far more complicated and challenging task.
In Chapter 6, Sumit Bisarya similarly considers the drawing (and redrawing) of 
the ‘federal map’,  comparing developments in defining the federal structure in 
South Sudan with changes to the status of Jammu and Kashmir in India. Bisarya 
focuses on the high-stakes issue of boundary delineation. In South Sudan, where 
the ongoing federalization process is tied to peacebuilding, debates on boundary 
delineation among contesting elites are understood as connected to their ability to 
shore up patronage networks within territories of influence. In India, where the 
special status of Jammu and Kashmir has endured since 1951, steps taken to 
divide the state into two Union Territories posed a legal conundrum and 
triggered a constitutional challenge in the Supreme Court. In both cases, changes 
to the federal map have been elite driven and unilateral, raising questions about 
whether systems that can be changed in this way can truly be called federal.
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1. A decade of constitution-building 
processes: some reflections from 
international experts
Sumit Bisarya (editor)
The year 2019 marks the end of the second decade of the 21st century, and much 
has happened in that time. The period has been marked by important events, 
such as the independence of South Sudan in 2011, as well as some notable trends, 
such as global mass social protest movements and a concerning decline in 
perceptions (and the quality) of democracy around the world. Since the latter half 
of the 20th century, constitution-building has become increasingly associated 
with peacebuilding and political transition processes as an important tool to 
support conflict mitigation and to secure political participation and inclusion. 
Moreover, the process of constitution-building has itself come to be understood 
as important for legitimacy, democracy and peace; the international community is 
increasingly involved in national constitution-building projects. As it has for 
centuries, the field of constitution-building continues to evolve in interesting and 
surprising ways.
To mark the end of the decade, International IDEA engaged in a series of 
conversations and discussions with international experts who have had first-hand 
experience in a variety of constitution-building processes around the world. The 
discussions were not intended as a systematic or comprehensive survey of the 
evolution of constitution-building over the past 10 years. Rather, the aim was to 
gather a range of opinions and insights on general trends, recurring issues and 
innovations, the role of international engagement, and successes and challenges in 
constitution-building to promote peace and democracy.
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Comparative constitution-building experts who participated in these 
discussions included the following scholars, practitioners and advisors:
• Adem Abebe, Editor, ConstitutionNet.org, International IDEA
• Anna Dziedzic, Global Academic Fellow and Associate Director of the 
Centre for Comparative and Public Law at the University of Hong Kong, 
speaking on the constitutional and legal systems in the Pacific Islands
• Rohan Edrisinha, Former UN Development Programme Senior 
Constitutional Advisor in Nepal, and Senior Constitutions Advisor for the 
UN Department for Peacebuilding and Political Affairs
• Tom Ginsburg, Professor of International Law and of Political Science at 
the University of Chicago, and Senior Advisor to the International IDEA 
Constitution-Building Programme
• Christina Murray, Professor Emeritus of Human Rights and 
Constitutional Law at the University of Cape Town, and Constitution- 
Making/Power-Sharing Expert, UN Standby Team of Senior Mediation 
Advisers
• Gabriel Negretto, Professor of Political Science at the Catholic University 
of Santiago de Chile, speaking on constitution-making in Latin America
• William Partlett, Associate Professor at Melbourne Law School, speaking 
on constitutional reforms in the post-soviet Europe/Eurasia region
This chapter summarizes some of the key takeaways from these conversations, 
which centred on five common questions. Expert comments have been edited for 
clarity and approved by the participants.
Q1: What have been some of the general trends in constitution-building over the 
last decade?
• (TG) Motives for changing constitutions have been increasingly often 
driven by authoritarian consolidation, rather than democratization.
• (WP) Certainly in the post-Soviet region there have also been several 
attempts to use constitutional reforms to advance self-interest, although 
this has sometimes backfired—for example, the popular revolution which 
followed the reforms of President Sargsyan in Armenia.
• (CM) I am not so sure whether there is increased frequency of 
authoritarian constitution-making, or whether constitution-building for 
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liberal democracy reasons has become less frequent. If that is the case, the 
question is why this is so? As another trend, I would add the failure of 
constitution-building as a conflict resolution tool.
• (GN) In Latin America, there has been an increasing burden based on 
constitutional reform, in terms of the expectations of the general public. 
People have translated demands for better education, health care and other 
issues of social equality into demands for constitutional change, with 
expectations that the new/revised constitution will deliver on these issues.
• (CM) I would say this is also true in Africa—at least in the sense that 
public demands for change often seem to default to demanding 
constitutional change. This may be in part because government is practised 
in an authoritarian way, within constitutional bounds, although 
constitutional arrangements actually permitted something better.
• (AD) In the Pacific Islands, constitutional change most often occurs 
through amendments, rather than making a new constitution. A common 
trend this decade, perhaps linked to this, is that many processes have 
stalled or collapsed, often due to elections and shifting parliamentary 
majorities. This could be an indication, perhaps, of the challenges of 
constitutional reform conducted by the regular legislature.
• (AD) Another feature which may be an emerging trend in the Pacific is the 
role of courts in constitutional reform processes. While the court has 
always been active in Papua New Guinea, its role in adjudicating 
amendments has grown this decade. Also, in Vanuatu we saw the court 
intervening to rule that reforms had to be ratified in a referendum. It will 
be interesting to see whether this becomes a broader trend in the coming 
years.
• (AA) Perhaps it was already the case, but it seems that constitution- 
building has become a more common part of the lexicon for people 
working in political transitions, and also on the part of popular 
movements demanding change.
Q2: Why have authoritarians sought to change—rather than simply ignore— 
constitutions? What are some counterexamples where constitutional reforms 
have been more successful at promoting peace and/or democracy?
• (RE) In certain countries in Asia, it has been a case of both—ignoring 
constitutional constraints, and then dismantling them.
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• (TG) Functional accounts are persuasive. Many cases in Africa seem to 
revolve around avoiding presidential term limits; in Morocco, 
constitutional change was used to diffuse/co-opt the local Arab Spring 
revolution.
• (CM) Hungary deserves mention here as a particular and important 
example. I think there, the reasons have been symbolic as well as 
functional.
• (GN) I would add two general observations: ruling under the law provides 
legitimacy, and so much of authoritarian constitution-making comes down 
to window dressing. Second, the constitution provides a coordination 
mechanism among elites.
• (WP) There has been an interesting element to this in the post-Soviet 
space—what I term the ‘theatre’ of constitutional reform. The 2020 
amendments in Russia are a prime example: a multi-day referendum, 
which coincided with the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II, 
was used to approve amendments that could have been approved in 
parliament. The motive was to paint a picture, through this ‘theatre’, of 
renewed mass support for the state.
• (RE) At the same time, the decade has not been without its democratic 
constitution-building successes. Nepal has its challenges, but should 
certainly be considered a process of democratization. In the Philippines, 
Bangsamoro gave up its secession demands based on a constitutional 
solution for increased autonomy.
• (TG) I would add Tunisia as a democratization success story. Kenya too, 
at the start of the decade, may be considered at least a partial success, in 
terms of the context of electoral violence at the time of constitutional 
reform.
• (CM) Fiji could also be considered a partial success, as it was one step 
further away from dictatorship. But let’s also note here that we are really 
only considering constitution-building in the wake of crisis. Constitutional 
change, often in the form of targeted amendments, occurs much more 
frequently, and one might assume with a greater degree of ‘success’.
• (WP) Successful democratizing processes in the post-Soviet space have 
been observed in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova. Ukraine should also 
be included, as it has passed a raft of reforms at both the constitutional 
and sub-constitutional levels, both in the wake of the Maidan Revolution 
and continuing under current President Zelensky.
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• (AA) I think it is part of a trend of the institutionalization of politics in 
Africa. Even authoritarians want to use the constitution to make, or 
prevent, change. They have the numbers and control to achieve their 
desired results through constitutional processes, so why deviate? Guinea 




regression, resistance to regression, progress and resistance to progress. 
Sometimes resistance works: Burkina Faso in 2014, and Mali in 2012 and 
2018, serve as examples where popular mobilization prevented the abuse of 
term limits and empowerment of the executive, respectively. Niger in 
2010, Mozambique in 2018 and Senegal in 2016 are also positive 
examples of progression. But there are also many examples wherein 
popularly driven, progressive changes were stalled/blocked by incumbent 
forces for the status quo—Tanzania for example, and also perhaps the 
current process in The Gambia.
Q3: What recurring issues have featured in constitutional design debates in the 
past decade? Have there been any noteworthy innovations?
• (AD) In the Pacific, a recurring issue is responding to political instability, 
though this certainly predates the last decade. Constitutional protection 
and recognition of customs have also been major features in processes, for 
example in Tuvalu and Samoa.
• (CM) In this regard, constitutional change is often used as a tool of 
political mobilization; claiming that the constitution undermines 
traditional values has traction. So proposing to tighten things up is a 
powerful political tool.
• (AD) Sometimes what is not on the constitutional agenda is also telling. 
The issue of women’s participation in politics has been a recurring debate. 
The region has extremely low levels of women’s representation in 
parliaments, and constitutional reforms often see a push for special 
measures met with an equally strong pushback from conservative elements. 
Samoa was successful in establishing a women’s quota, although that was 
quite modest (10 per cent) and the constitutional amendment was made 
by a government with a strong parliamentary majority.
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• (TG) Rights provisions have been expanding for longer than the past 
decade. Constitutions are also saying more about anti-corruption and the 
environment.
• (CM) On rights, clearly justiciable socio-economic rights now seem almost 
routine. Rights provisions are also becoming more detailed in order to 
speak to particular constituencies. For example, words relating to women 
and other groups in the Kenyan Constitution do not formally change their 
rights, but do speak to these groups.
• (GN) The expansion of individual rights or the inclusion of new socio- 
economic rights (such as access to water) has been a feature of several 
constitutional changes during the last decade in Latin America. Among 
other recurring issues, it is important to mention reforms intended to 
improve judicial efficiency and accountability, reduce public corruption, 
and increase direct popular participation. Controversial reforms and 
judicial interpretations relaxing executive term limits have also been salient 
topics of debate.
• (WP) A common debate in post-Soviet contexts has been how to make 
formal rules matter in cultures in which they have historically been 
ignored. There is some space here for innovation, either through adapting/ 
reforming extant institutions such as the procuracy or through more 
innovative approaches, such as the Office of the Chancellor of Justice in 
Estonia.
• (WP) While not common enough to be called a trend, the decade has been 
bracketed by the constitutional reforms in Kyrgyzstan and current debates 
in Armenia, in which there have been drives (successful in the former, as of 
yet undetermined in the latter) to abolish constitutional courts and assign 
responsibility for judicial review to the regular courts.
• (WP) The example of Kazakhstan is interesting, and perhaps an 
innovation. Rather than prolong his already decades-long tenure as 
president, and in order to plan his succession, former President 
Nazarbayev reformed the Constitution to reduce the powers of the 
president and give constitutional status to the Security Council, of which 
he made himself lifetime head, and from where he can control events from 
behind the scenes.
• (RE) Federalization has been a common debate in post-conflict contexts, 
but with the exception of Nepal most of these processes have yet to arrive 
at a constitutional resolution. In Asia, religion and cultural issues continue 
to be at the forefront of many constitutional reform debates.
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• (CM) Many processes seem to have stalled or collapsed due to devolution/ 
autonomy issues. It might not have been the only issue, but certainly in 
contexts as varied as Tanzania, Solomon Islands, Mali and Yemen, 
negotiations over the structure of the state were a central challenge. Term 
limits—and more generally how to constrain executive power—have been 
another recurring issue. It is also important to recognize the importance of 
issues such as same-sex marriage and abortion, around which there is often 
mass mobilization on both sides. Groups on both sides often 
opportunistically use these issues to either smuggle through other issues, or 
to block reforms, and thus often have an important effect on the passage 
(or not) of reforms.
• (AA) There has been progress both ways. Decentralization has been a 
common issue on the constitutional agenda, including during processes in 
Mozambique, Kenya, The Gambia and Senegal. Term limits, of course, 
have often been central. Various issues relating to the distrust of political 
actors—such as fourth-branch institutions and independent prosecution 
services—have been on various agendas. The inclusion of women in 
politics is meeting with less resistance, at least in terms of formal 
constitutional provisions—even in authoritarian contexts such as Guinea.
Q4: How has the process of constitution-building evolved over the past 10 years?
• (ALL) There is now much more involvement of the public.
• (WP) Even in post-Soviet contexts, we have seen increased efforts to 
engage the public in constitutional reforms. The timing is instructive: the 
last decade has been a period of relative stability following the economic 
depression and violent civil conflict. Together with an emerging civil 
society, which did not exist before, and the growing use of social media, 
this has resulted in more calls for public engagement in processes of 
constitutional change.
• (GN and TG) The randomly selected citizen assemblies of Iceland, Ireland 
and Mongolia are certainly an innovation, and perhaps becoming a trend 
as a new form of public participation.
• (CM) In addition to greater public involvement, there have certainly been 
demands for broader inclusion, to make the constitution-making bodies 
themselves more representative of society. Whether this has happened or 
not, I don’t think we know.
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• (AA) In Africa, expert commissions have been a common feature of 
constitution-making. Previously they were more common in anglophone 
countries, but in recent years francophone countries have more frequently 
used commissions, compared with the large conferences of the 1990s. 
However, the commissions seem to be more expert/independent in 
composition in anglophone countries, whereas in francophone countries 
they are more often appointed by the president. Another important 
difference between anglophone Africa and the rest of the continent relates 
to constitutional rupture: in places such as Burundi, Comoros and Guinea 
we have seen arguments that constituent power overrides constitutional 
change constraints, whereas anglophone countries have been more inclined 
to ensure constitutional continuity.
Q5: What has been the role of, and receptiveness to, international assistance in 
constitution-making? What other forms of cross-border learning have been at 
play? Has the globalization or regionalization of norms been an important 
factor?
• (AA) Expert commissions and civil society organizations in general have 
not only accepted, but also demanded (and expected) international 
assistance. Political actors are more likely to resist such assistance.
• (AD) Among the Pacific Islands, there is an openness to listen to 
international expert advice, but also the confidence to reject it. There is a 
strong sense of national sovereignty and ‘doing things our way’, rather 
than any sense of regional norms. International norms, of course, are 
present in most contexts because of the constitutions that countries were 
left with at independence.
• (GN) The recent movements for constitutional reform in Chile and 
Panama show there has been a learning process in the region with respect 
to the Bolivarian model of using deep public participation to legitimize 
one side of the debate. Interestingly, the countries most often referred to at 
the moment in Chile are from outside the region—Iceland and South 
Africa.
• (WP) The post-Soviet space is really divided into two regions. On one side 
are countries such as Armenia, the Baltic states, Georgia and Ukraine, 
which welcome globalized norms of constitutionalism, and where the 
advice of the Venice Commission has been influential. On the other side 
are countries such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan, where the common denominators are national sovereignty, 
national identity and founding myths. But these countries also learn from 
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each other: I believe Russian President Vladimir Putin would have 
observed and considered the reforms adopted in Kazakhstan before 
deciding to go the way he did with the 2020 amendments.
• (TG) I would say there has been greater resistance to international 
assistance efforts over the past decade, and a need to be more strategic 
about the way assistance is provided. Some hard questions need to be 
asked by international assistance providers regarding the objective of 
international advice and the meaning of national ownership in this 
context. The best examples of international assistance I have seen have 
been where a plurality of international organizations works together to 
provide different views and forms of advice.
• (CM) I agree that we need to look at how we give advice/support, 
although I would stop short of saying there has generally been greater 
resistance. Do we really know? It would be excellent to have some research 
on the idea of where and how advice has been most effective.
• (AA) In Africa, the role of the Africa Union (AU) has been interesting to 
watch. There has been a nascent regionalization of constitutional law 
standards. For example, the ‘broad consensus’ requirement for 
constitutional amendments is having an impact, as is the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. For example, one case against Côte d’Ivoire 
concerned the composition of the Electoral Commission, which was 
composed of representatives of political actors and dominated by the 
ruling party and presidency. The court said it was not impartial, and is 
incompatible with the requirement of the African Charter on Democracy, 
Elections and Governance on neutrality and independence. In another 
case against Tanzania, the court found that a constitutional ban on 
independent candidates was incompatible with the African Charter.
• (AA) Given the rise of popular movements which have become more 
common to change regimes and trigger constitutional change, the 
international community has become more nuanced in its responses to 
unconstitutional changes of government over the course of the decade. 
Compared with the previous stance, which rejected all coups and military 
roles in political transitions, perhaps in recent cases we have seen an 
increasing acceptance of the military’s role in transitional governments? 
There has been no change in regards to the unconstitutional retention of 
power. An illustrative example is Burundi in 2015: the president tried to 
amend the Constitution, was blocked by the Senate, and then used a 
friendly Constitutional Court instead. AU technocrats tried to take a 
stand, but political organs pushed back. If there is any progress in this 
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realm, it is with regards to public pressure on the AU to be forceful in 
regard to term limits.
• (AA) Lastly, on external assistance in Africa I would say there is an 
increasing network among Africans, and an increasing trend to look for 
constitution-makers, and those providing technical assistance, to reference 
comparative examples from within the continent, rather than the older 
examples of the USA, Canada, Germany, etc.
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Constitutions are increasingly theorized as outcomes of bargains or pacts in which 
contesting political elites agree on a governance framework in a transition from 
conflict to peace and authoritarianism to competitive democracy, or the 
consolidation of peace and democracy (Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton 2009). To 
protect such pacts, contesting parties and constitutional designers rely on tried 
and tested tactics: making amendment procedures more stringent than those 
required for regular legislative decisions.
Nevertheless, the circumstances and context that force or incentivize dominant 
political groups to compromise or concede—described here as moments of 
vulnerability—do not always last; resurgent or emergent political personalities or 
groups have on many occasions backtracked on or removed key constitutional 
pacts. Traditional amendment procedures that rely on supermajorities, 
referendums and even unamendable provisions do not always succeed in taming 
resurgent or new political hegemons from reversing critical compromises.
This chapter explains the challenge of maintaining moments of vulnerability 
that engender pacts by using reform processes that were approved or initiated in 
2019, using Guinea and Zimbabwe as case studies. It also considers how 
constitutional drafters may seek to effectively protect key constitutional pacts.
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After describing the moment of vulnerability, the third section covers the case 
studies. The next section argues that the effective safeguarding of critical pacts 
requires conditioning change to comparable pacts based on what I call ‘inclusive 
majoritarianism’. The last section concludes.
Constitutional pacts and the ‘moment of vulnerability’
While constitutions are sometimes described as identifying, affirming and/or 
proclaiming the fundamental values of the imagined ‘people’,  the institutional 
architecture they establish is often a product of the ideas of the time and context 
and, crucially, the power balance among the dominant forces at the time of 
constitutional writing or change. As Mark Graber notes (2006: 200), ‘most 
constitutions are compromises, not declarations of shared values or blueprints of 
the good society’.  Despite the recognition and increasingly ubiquitous role of 
popular participation in constitution-making processes, ultimately, constitutions, 
especially their institutional framework, are predominantly ‘bargains  among 
elites’ (Elkins,  Ginsburg and Melton 2009: 7). In short, constitutions are 
primarily elite pacts, among themselves and collectively with the people.
Some contemporary constitutions are written in contexts where the dominant 
group feels vulnerable and has to make concessions to defuse pressure and 
maintain power. In other cases, the dominant political personality or group may 
have been removed and a replacement has not emerged, with many aspiring but 
unsure political constellations jostling for power. In all cases, constitutions that 
evolve as pacts, bargains or concessions are often made at moments of 
vulnerability and uncertainty.
Constitutions that are written under a single dominant personality or political 
group are unlikely to constitute or be described as pacts. A level of power balance 
in which incumbent forces are not that much more powerful than their 
opponents—what Javier Coralles (2018: 7) calls ‘reduced  asymmetry’—is 
necessary for a constitution-making process to result in a negotiated bargain or 
‘power-diffusing constitution’.
Nevertheless, pacts may also be agreed even where constitutions are written 
under a single dominant force in an attempt to ensure the alternation of power 
within the group, such as through presidential term limits. For instance, Tanzania 
in 1995 was the first country in Africa to experience a transfer of power as a result 
of term limits when the incumbent president left power after serving two terms. 
The term limits were introduced into the Constitution following the departure of 
long-time leader Julius Nyerere. With his departure, Nyerere and the ruling party 
sought to preclude the dominance of a single person and ensure the peaceful 
transfer of power through term limits (Vanguard Africa 2019). This intraparty 
pact has held up since then; although there is talk of tampering with the term 
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limits to allow current President John Mangufuli to run for more than two terms, 
he has ruled out this possibility (The African Exponent 2019).
More recently, President Pierre Nkurunziza of Burundi led the drafting of a 
new constitution in 2018 while serving a contested third term. There were 
concerns that the new Constitution would remove term limits or otherwise allow 
him to run again (Vandeginste 2018). Nevertheless, internal dynamics in the 
ruling party ensured the retention of the two-term limit on presidents (with terms 
extended from five to seven years). Although the new Constitution does not 
explicitly count past terms, Nkurunziza was expected to step down (before his 
unexpected passing in June 2020) and a new president was elected in May 2020. 
The strength of the ruling party and the aspirations of its diverse members have 
ensured that term limits are included as an intraparty pact.
The moment of vulnerability or reduced power asymmetry that generates 
constitutions-as-pacts may not always last; there is often a risk that one party to 
the pact will renege. To insure against this risk, parties and constitutional drafters 
rely on a time-tested strategy—rigid amendment procedures. In a context of free, 
fair and competitive democratic elections that modern constitutions assume, 
amendment procedures that require supermajority parliamentary approval (alone 
or in combination with referendums, or double legislative approval with an 
intervening election) are accepted as effective political safeguards against the 
reversal of key components of the pact by either resurgent or emerging political 
hegemons. Although cumbersome amendment procedures can be criticized as 
undemocratic and anti-majoritarian, they are accepted as necessary to ensure 
constitutional stability and political competition.
Under ideal democratically competitive circumstances, standard constitutional 
amendment procedures may provide sufficient insurance against the reversal of 
fundamental constitutional pacts. Nevertheless, the assumption of genuine 
democratic competition does not always hold, and an old dominant political force 
may recuperate or a new one may emerge. Therefore, pacts last only as long as the 
power balance remains in place; when power shifts to the extent that there is one 
dominant political force, the pact may be undone through unilateral 
constitutional changes.
Constitutions are rarely self-enforcing. The continued relevance of 
constitutional limits on government power requires sustaining comparable levels 
of power balance and moments of vulnerability as at the time of constitutional 
negotiation. Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton (2009: 66) write that the endurance of 
constitutional bargains depends on ‘(a) whether the parties feel that they would be 
better off under different terms, (b) the  expected sanctions for breaching the 
agreement, and (c) whether  the existing agreement can be amended easily or 
otherwise accommodate change’. While the authors outline these conditions in a 
context of constitutional death or replacement, the conditions can be similarly 
applicable in cases of significant constitutional amendments.
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In short, constitutional pacts require guarantee mechanisms, which mainly 
come in the form of stringent amendment procedures. Nevertheless, standard 
amendment procedures assume free and fair elections and the guaranteed 
presence and performance of a strong opposition—that is, democratic 
competition to at least disrupt ostensibly legal but self-serving reforms. For 
instance, attempts to remove term limits have failed in Zambia (Frederick 
Chiluba in 2001), Malawi (Bakili Muluzi in 2002) and Nigeria (Olusegun 
Obasanjo in 2006) principally due to the strength of opposition parties, which 
empowered divergent voices within the president’s  party. Where constitutional 
pacts are adopted as intraparty bargains, the parties need to remain strong in 
order to prevent dominant personalities from undermining the pacts. 
Furthermore, courts may provide additional safeguards to ensure respect for pacts, 
especially through the use of unamendable provisions which are recognized 
specifically in the constitution or judicial interpretation (on Colombia, see 
Marinero 2010).
The people are naturally the ultimate guarantors of constitutional frameworks, 
including key pacts. Where a pact draws bright red lines, such as presidential term 
limits, potential popular mobilization could either discourage attempts to remove 
pacts or unseat those who violate them. For instance, protesters in Burkina Faso 
forced former President Blaise Compaore out of power in 2014 when he 
attempted to amend the Constitution to continue his more than two-decade rule 
(Signe 2014). Finally, international institutions and other external actors may also 
influence respect for (or even violation of) constitutional pacts.
The next sections discuss how the moments of vulnerability at the time of 
constitutional adoption led to the adoption of pacts on key areas, and how 
resurgent or new political hegemons reversed such pacts in Guinea and 
Zimbabwe.
Guinea-Conakry
In a March 2020 referendum, Guineans approved a new constitution to replace 
the 2010 Constitution. The president enacted the new Constitution into law the 
following month (AFP 2020). The 2010 Constitution was drafted in a context of 
a transition from dictatorship to a democratic dispensation under a military 
government that took power following the death of long-time authoritarian leader 
Lansana Conte in 2008. Divisions within the military, powerful opposition and 
international pressure forced the military to give up power under a new 
constitution.
A key rallying point for the opposition to Conte’s  authoritarianism was the 
removal of a two-term limit on presidents, first introduced in the wave of reforms 
in the 1990 Constitution, through a referendum in 2001 (Niang 2019). This 
change allowed Conte to run again and win a third term in 2003. Following his 
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death in 2008, there was broad agreement that the two-term limit should be 
reinstated. The absence of a dominant force leading the constitution-making 
process, whether within government or the opposition, as well as the experience 
with Conte made term limits inevitable. In addition, the political class and the 
drafters sought to make it impossible to remove the term limits in the future. 
Accordingly, article 154 of the 2010 Constitution provided that ‘the number and 
the duration of the mandates of the President of the Republic may not be made 
the object of a [constitutional] revision’.  In short, there was effectively a pact 
among the political class, as well as with the people, regarding the importance of 
presidential term limits and their inviolability.
Alpha Conde, who became the first president under the 2010 Constitution, 
was a vocal opponent of the 2001 referendum removing term limits. After 
establishing himself at the helm of the dominant ruling party, he won two 
successive terms. Under the Constitution, his current second term should have 
been his last. Nevertheless, political dominance came with a temptation for the 
elderly Conde, who turned 82 in March 2020. His supporters and political allies 
started to promote the idea of allowing him to run again.
Aware of the prohibition on constitutional revision to change term limits, the 
ruling political group cleverly distinguished between revisions and the making of 
a new constitution. Accordingly, while tampering with the term limits was the 
principal objective (Niang 2020), the government relied on versions of the 
constituent power of the people to adopt a new constitution. This distinction was 
clearly against the intention of the 2010 Constitution (Abebe 2019).
To strengthen their call for a new constitution, Conde and his supporters 
alluded to the fact that the 2010 Constitution was adopted under a military 
dictatorship and was without a popular referendum, and therefore lacked popular 
legitimacy. Yet all political groups, including Conde’s, had supported the decision 
not to submit the document to a referendum in order to accelerate the transition 
from military rule to democracy.
This claimed lack of popular legitimacy and clumsy drafting of the provision 
prohibiting revisions, without specifically prohibiting the making of new 
constitutions, mean that tampering with term limits provided ostensible moral 
and legal justification for pursuing a new constitution. Under the new 
Constitution, a president can serve two terms of six years each. In the absence of a 
specific provision counting terms served under the 2010 Constitution, Conde was 
able to run again in—and won—the October 2020 elections.
The reliance on unamendable provisions to safeguard a critical pact failed to 
achieve its purpose to ensure the peaceful alternation of power.
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Zimbabwe
In December 2019, after months of work behind the scenes, the Government of 
Zimbabwe tabled before parliament a bill to amend the 2013 Constitution that 
would allow the president to promote judges to higher offices and do away with 
requirements to publicly interview candidates (Hofisi 2020). This bill followed 
the enactment of the first amendment to the Constitution in 2017, which 
empowered the president to appoint the three highest judicial offices—the chief 
justice, deputy chief justice and judge president of the High Court—without the 
need for public interviews, subject merely to non-binding consultation with the 
Judicial Service Commission (Hofisi 2017). In March 2020, the Constitutional 
Court invalidated this amendment on the grounds that the Senate vote did not 
achieve the required number of votes for a valid constitutional amendment. The 
court gave the Senate 180 days to revote on the amendment, failing which the 
amendment becomes invalid (ICJ 2020). The 180-day period expired at the end 
of September 2020, but the government sought an extension of the period, and 
the Constitutional Court granted a provisional order suspending the nullification 
until a final decision after hearing all parties could be rendered. The amendment 
is presumed to be invalid and the government would have to go through the 
entire constitutional amendment process if it wants to reinstate it. The proposed 
bill would expand the exemption from public interviews to the promotion of key 
judicial officers.
The 2013 Constitution was an outcome of the 2008 Global Political 
Agreement (GPA) (Mutisi 2011) to quell the violence and political paralysis that 
accompanied Zimbabwe’s most competitive elections, in which the late Morgan 
Tsvangirai won the first round of presidential elections against incumbent 
President Robert Mugabe but refused to join the run-off because of the 
government’s  oppressive and violent tactics. The GPA was signed under the 
auspices of the Southern Africa Development Community between the ruling 
party (ZANU-PF) and the two main opposition parties (MDC-T and MDC).
A central element of the GPA was the making of a new constitution, 
spearheaded by a Select Committee on Constitution Making Process (COPAC) 
composed of 25 members of parliament from the three parties (ConstitutionNet 
2011). Although the constitution-making process was supported by expert 
thematic committees, involved broad popular, stakeholder and civil society 
consultation, and was finally approved in a referendum, fundamental decisions 
were made through bargaining and compromise in the Select Committee. Indeed, 
the endorsement of the draft constitution by the three political groups in the 
committee was critical for its overwhelming (almost 95 per cent) popular 
approval in March 2013.
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The 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe was a quintessential pact negotiated 
between the ruling party and a strong opposition. Had it not been for the power 
balance, the Constitution was not ‘one  ZANU-PF would have 
written’ (Mushonga  2014). In particular, the opposition was a victim of the 
weaponization of the judicial process and sought to ensure that judicial 
appointment and removal processes were safeguarded against government 
manipulation, while the ruling party aimed to maintain the president’s dominant 
role in the appointment process. The opposition also wanted parliament to vet 
and approve candidates. As a compromise, the parties agreed to a process that 
grants significant powers to the independent judicial service commission, as well 
as a competitive and transparent process of public advertisements and interviews 
for all key judicial positions, while the president retains the formal power of 
appointment.
Following the ruling party’s dominant performance in both the 2013 and 2018 
elections, in which it secured a majority enabling it to unilaterally amend the 
Constitution, ZANU-PF sought to roll back some of the negotiated bargains. The 
judiciary, perhaps one of the critical areas of deliberate compromise, was a target 
of both the 2017 and 2019 amendment initiatives.
Considering the bargaining process that led to the 2013 Constitution, and 
Zimbabwe’s history of regressive constitutional amendments, including to reverse 
unfavourable court decisions (Madhuku 1999; The Zimbabwean  2020), it is 
surprising that the Constitution did not entrench provisions related to the 
judiciary and make them subject to a referendum for amendment. Nor was the 
idea of unamendable provisions considered.
Pacts for pacts: inclusive majoritarianism
While substantive human rights and other provisions have increasingly become 
standard across constitutions, key institutional designs remain principally 
outcomes of contestation and concessions—pacts principally between political 
leaders, but also involving the people as demanders and/or guarantors of such 
pacts. Pacts are the outcomes of broad consensus. Constitutional pacts are 
particularly notable in relation to provisions limiting entry into office (such as 
presidential term limits and candidacy requirements) and presidential powers 
(such as those limiting the presidential role in appointing judicial and other office 
holders). Given the choice, dominant leaders are likely either to consider such 
limits unnecessary or to avoid them, perceiving them as limits both on their 
personal freedom to run and on their current or prospective offices.
To safeguard these pacts and concessions, constitutional drafters employ a 
range of mechanisms broadly defined as constitutional amendment procedures, 
which are designed to enable a degree of flexibility to adapt to changing needs, 
circumstances, knowledge and evolution of ideas as expressions of popular 
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sovereignty, while ensuring a level of constitutional continuity and stability 
(International IDEA 2014). Amendment procedures normally take the form of 
some combination of a legislative supermajority (in one or two houses), 
referendum, double legislative approval (with an election in between) and, in 
federations, the approval of a specified number of states. Constitutions may also 
include unamendable provisions or prohibit amendments during certain periods, 
such as states of exception (war, emergencies).
Common procedural requirements for amendments—which may broadly be 
classified as ‘supermajoritarian’—are assumed to ensure that constitutional pacts 
are not casually distorted or abandoned and serve as proxies for cross-party 
approval of reforms. Such requirements are designed to prevent a single group 
from engaging in self-serving amendments to convert their transient dominance 
into long-term constitutional advantage. Supermajority requirements assume that, 
given a level of competitive democracy, opposition voices will secure enough 
legislative seats to be able to block amendments exclusively pushed by the ruling 
political group (Böckenförde 2017). Nevertheless, as noted in relation to the case 
studies described here, electoral competition favours incumbents, including 
through outright rigging or suppression of the opposition, leading to the 
dominance of a single group. This is a reality in many contexts and should not 
simply be wished away when designing amendment procedures.
Pragmatism may require that constitutional amendments must directly require 
pacts as the only basis to change at least the most critical and explicit pacts, i.e. 
pacts for pacts. Therefore, constitutional amendment procedures should 
reconsider the common reliance on supermajoritarianism, or unamendable 
provisions, and complement it with what I call inclusive majoritarianism. Under 
inclusive majoritarianism, a constitutional amendment would be valid only if it is 
approved by an absolute legislative majority (or a relatively low supermajority), 
but the composition of this majority must include votes from the incumbent 
party as well as a determined percentage of opposition votes. Inclusive 
majoritarianism may be seen as an adaptation of the idea of ‘separation of parties, 
not branches’ (Levinson and Pildes 2006). Rather than relying on the size of the 
legislative majority as a proxy to engender broad political consensus in support of 
amendments, this approach would pursue broad consensus more directly by 
ensuring that amendments have support beyond the ruling party or coalition, 
regardless of the size of its dominance. Referendums can still complement, but 
not substitute for, inclusive majoritarian procedures, and can safeguard against 
cross-party ploys to abuse power or undermine the voices of the people or 
political and legal accountability. In countries with diverse communities, the 
referendum rules may require certain levels of approval across a determined 
number of regions/groups.
The concept of broad consensus as the basis for the legitimacy of constitution- 
making and revisions has been endorsed at the African level. Article 10(2) of the 
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African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance requires states parties 
to ensure that ‘the process of amendment or revision of their constitution reposes 
on national consensus, obtained if need be, through referendum’.  The idea of 
inclusive majoritarianism ensures that amendments are in fact based on broad 
consensus.
By requiring cross-party approval, inclusive majoritarianism could make 
change difficult, and even allow a political minority to prevent necessary changes 
through veto, thereby entrenching the status quo that represents the judgments of 
past generations at the expense of the current generation’s  right to self- 
governance. The proposal may therefore lead to a situation in which the fear of 
illegitimate amendments could protect an illegitimate constitutional framework. 
Dominant groups could then claim the right to entirely bypass the constitutional 
framework.
Nevertheless, inclusive majoritarianism does not require all minority groups to 
approve proposed amendments. It should only prevent a single political party or 
aligned coalition from changing the constitution. As such, requiring that a small 
proportion of the opposition agrees to the proposal would suffice. In addition, in 
many contexts, electoral outcomes exaggerate the dominance of the winning 
party, partly as a result of incumbent abuses, and partly as a function of the 
electoral system, especially in countries with first-past-the-post electoral systems. 
The requirement for cross-party approval would provide a necessary correction. 
Moreover, to reduce its abuse, constitutions may require inclusive 
majoritarianism for changes to vulnerable provisions in a single parliament but 
require that the change be approved by a supermajority in two successive 
parliaments (i.e. after an intervening election).
Inclusive majoritarianism can be justified on both legitimacy and practical 
grounds. Because an amendment would require interparty engagement and 
compromise, the outcome is likely to more effectively approximate the popular 
consensus, which is the principal determinant of democratic legitimacy. It also 
has practical benefits. For instance, the process encourages better deliberation and 
the consideration of the passion, reasoning, ideology and interests of a diverse set 
of political groups. Requiring interparty approval of constitutional amendments 
would help prevent political forces from enacting capricious and self-serving 
constitutional amendments. The relative difficulty of enacting amendments may 
therefore be seen as an acceptable trade-off. A pragmatic problem requires a 
pragmatic solution. The process would also encourage political groups to develop 
a culture of regular engagement and compromise, and to recognize the legitimacy 
of each other’s existence. These experiences can engender a politics of moderation 
even in daily political discourse.
In recognition of the fact that inclusive majoritarianism makes constitutional 
change particularly difficult, it is suggested that it should only be used to 
safeguard the most vulnerable pacts, which will inevitably be contextual, against 
1
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change in the form of constitution amendment, revision or replacement. 
Provisions limiting access to or retention of public office, particularly the 
presidency, presidential powers, the electoral system, and provisions protecting 
the independence and authority of courts and fourth-branch institutions could be 
considered. For other provisions, standard amendment procedures relying on 
supermajorities, referendums and time (or a combination) could suffice.
Concluding remarks
These case studies demonstrate how constitutional amendments could be used to 
undermine key pacts at the time of constitution writing. This chapter argues that 
inclusive majoritarianism can provide an effective political safeguard against 
formal constitutional regression.
Overall, as pacts, constitutions should require comparable pacts to change 
them. With such a safeguard, constitutional pacts sow the seeds of their own 
reversal. Nevertheless, the ultimate protection of democratic constitutionalism 
requires constitutions to be seen as a pact with the people. Sufficient public 
ownership of the constitutional framework, and particularly key pacts, is therefore 
critical, regardless of the elite bargaining origins of the constitution. Political 
actors are unlikely to resort to capricious amendments if they expect a public 
backlash, which is best secured by establishing a genuine democratic framework. 
The most secure way to protect and sustain a democratic dispensation is to create 
the conditions for genuinely competitive democracy.
Accordingly, while inclusive majoritarianism could help check attempts to 
undercut such conditions, it is not a substitute for innovative mechanisms to 
address the incumbency advantage, strengthening the capacity, resources and 
policy orientation of political parties, and improving popular understanding, 
ownership and support for constitutional democracy.
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3. The how and why of participatory 
constitution-building: (re)examining 
expectations, processes and outcomes in 
The Gambia and Mongolia
Erin C. Houlihan
Introduction
Historically, constitution-making was understood as a legal-political exercise best 
undertaken by jurists and political elites. In Philadelphia in 1787 a select group of 
white, mostly wealthy, landowning men deliberated what was to become the US 
Constitution—a text that would reorganize the conflict-affected lives and 
prospects of millions of men and women of diverse national origins, indigenous 
peoples and hundreds of thousands of enslaved African Americans. Constitution- 
making is a high-stakes process that involves the (re)distribution of access to 
power and resources, the recognition of identities, and the protection of 
individual and collective rights. In practice, and as the Philadelphia experience 
reveals, constitution-making is a process of negotiation and bargaining that 
operates within a framework of constraints, interests, passions and reason (Elster 
1995). It involves a series of decisions to establish the rules and forums in which 
the constitutional text is written, deliberated and ratified. These choices are 
recognized as highly consequential for the future of peace and democracy, though 
in ways that are not yet fully understood (e.g. Elster 1995; Ginsburg et al. 2009; 
Ghai and Galli 2006).
For nearly two centuries, public participation in constitution-making was 
limited to voting in elections for constitution-making bodies and in ratification 
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referendums. Moreover, voting rights were limited to narrow segments of the 
population. Public participation has since expanded to other stages of 
constitution-making in ways that parallel changing perceptions about the purpose 
and importance of constitutions and constitutional reform processes, and which 
are rooted in the development of legal and normative frameworks on democratic 
governance, human rights and peace. In post-conflict and transitional 
constitutional reform processes in particular, public participation is increasingly 
understood as crucial for popular legitimacy and outcomes for democracy and 
sustainable peace. The ways in which participation influences and contributes to 
—or potentially detracts from—these desirable outcomes, however, is not 
systematically understood.
Today, constitution-making is better understood as the centrepiece of a broader 
constitution-building process. Constitution-building  describes a long-term, 
inclusive and participatory process that combines the legal, political and social 
aspects of state transformation. It involves initial consensus-building and 
bargaining around the design of institutions for the drafting and adopting of the 
constitutional text, choices about how decisions are made within those 
institutions, and developing practices and conventions for interpreting, 
implementing and nurturing the text following promulgation (Ghai and Galli 
2006: 9). The notion that constitutions and constitutional cultures are built 
through the inclusion and participation of ‘the  people’  has, since around the 
1990s, transformed from an aspirational ideal into a transnational norm, 
particularly for post-conflict and transitioning states (Hart 2003; Saati 2017; 
Franck and Thiruvengadam 2010).
Accordingly, citizens today generally expect to be consulted in the constitution- 
making process, and process designers incorporate participation in various ways 
and at various stages of the constitutional reform process. The ways in which 
participation processes are designed at the country level, the participatory 
mechanisms selected to collect and assess public opinion, and how this data is fed 
into decision-making processes differ in significant ways and are highly dependent 
on context, resources and access to comparative knowledge (see Brandt et al. 
2011).
This chapter examines the public participation processes undertaken in The 
Gambia and Mongolia in 2019 as part of their constitutional reform endeavours. 
It seeks to contribute further insights into the relationship between decision- 
makers’  assumptions and expectations about the normative, substantive and 
instrumental utilities of public participation (as inferred from public statements 
and documents); the influence of context-specific constraints and opportunities; 
and methodological decisions about the design of the participation process and 
choice of participation mechanisms.
The chapter is organized into four parts. The first provides a brief overview of 
current scholarship and frameworks on participatory constitution-building and 
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considers gaps between scholarship and practice. The second examines public 
participation in The Gambia in 2019 as part of the country’s ongoing process to 
develop a new constitutional text. The third focuses on Mongolia’s  2019 
constitutional amendment process and the use of deliberative polling and other 
participatory measures to obtain public opinion. It concludes by drawing brief 
comparative observations and considerations.
Overview of scholarship and practice on participatory 
constitution-building
For centuries, philosophers and political theorists have contemplated the values 
and risks of public participation in the conduct of government affairs. In the 20th 
century, democratic peace theory scholars found empirical support for the long- 
held belief that liberal democracy is essential to sustainable peace (Levy 1989: 88; 
Saati 2015). In the 1990s, two UN Secretary-General reports accordingly linked 
democratization to peace and security, formally incorporating participatory 
constitution-building into the global peace agenda (UN Secretary-General 1992, 
1996). This normative proposition has been further buttressed by developments 
in international (and national) law since the 1970s, which seek to apply the right 
to participation in the conduct of public affairs (ICCPR, article 25) to the process 
of constitution-making (Hart 2010; Franck and Thiruvengadam 2010).
Accordingly, waves of scholarship on public participation in constitution- 
building provide theoretical and some empirical insights into the presumed 
instrumental, normative and substantive benefits of participation on desirable 
social, political and governance outcomes. Briefly, this includes, inter alia, 
educating the public on constitutional issues and fostering civic engagement (see 
e.g. Rousseau [1761]1923; Mill 1862); strengthening attitudes about democracy 
(Moehler 2008); improving the content of a constitution, constitutional 
endurance and the process of democratization (e.g. Samuels 2006; Ginsburg et al. 
2009; Elkins et al. 2008; Gluck and Brandt 2015); and contributing to more 
sustainable peace at the country level (Ghai and Galli 2006; Hart 2003; Samuels 
2006) and globally (e.g. Levy 1989; Hegre et al. 2001). Public participation is 
also lauded for helping to build a narrative of popular legitimacy for the new 
governance dispensation and a sense of guardianship over the constitutional text, 
which is crucial for effective constitutional implementation and performance 
(Hart 2003; Moehler 2008; Ihonvbere 2000).
However, public participation also poses risks. Particularly in conflict-affected 
states and divided societies, where constitutional reform is often linked to peace- 
and nation-(re)building aims, designing a participation process is a delicate task. 
Prior studies have suggested that in some circumstances, broad public 
participation may lead to discord between decision-makers who have ultimate 
authority over the constitutional text, those who will be responsible for 
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implementation, and the broader public (e.g. Widner 2004; Gluck and Brandt 
2015). Other risks include exacerbating conflict fault lines or inciting new forms 
of unrest through the manipulation of the participation process by interest 
groups, the ethnicization of public opinion, or the rise of anti-pluralist or anti- 
constitutionalist populist agendas (Ghai and Galli 2006; Gluck and Brandt 
2015). Moreover, public opinion is not always aligned with democratic 
principles, values and structures; majoritarian constitution-making, though 
potentially highly participatory, may in practice contribute to a constitutional 
structure that undermines democracy and/or is less than optimal for marginalized 
communities (e.g. Partlett 2012). Broad participation may also make it more 
difficult for negotiating elites to develop compromise positions and to build the 
political consensus necessary for the adoption of the text (e.g. Horowitz 2002; 
Arato 1995).
One key challenge for understanding the presumed benefits and risks of public 
participation is that there is no uniform definition of what constitutes 
‘participation’ in the literature other than by empirical observation that the public 
has, in some way, taken part (Saati 2015). Participation is variously 
operationalized according to different normative and empirical criteria, which 
limits the ability to systematically examine the relationship between particular 
participation mechanisms, the manner in which results are used, the stage(s) of 
the constitution-making process during which participation takes place, and 
presumed outcomes for democracy, peace, legitimation, etc. given a country’s 
particular context.
Scholars and practitioners increasingly recognize that many theories and 
assumptions about public participation are untested and have called for more 
systematic and empirical investigation (e.g. Widner 2005, 2008; Moehler 2008; 
Diamond et al. 2014; Ginsburg et al. 2009; Saati 2015). A notable contribution 
to bridging this gap includes Abrak Saati’s (2015) work to define a framework to 
analyse and categorize participation types. This framework considers who initiated 
the process, the form of communication used, the degree of inclusion and who 
had the final authority over the constitutional document. Participation types are 
categorized as false, symbolic, limited, consultative and substantive, which 
facilitates the examination of the relationship between types of participation and 
levels of democracy.
While Saati’s  typology considers participation in the constitution-making 
process as a whole, other scholars have examined whether the nature and use of 
particular participation modalities during various stages of constitution-making is 
significant for democratic outcomes. This research has identified links, for 
example, between outcomes for democracy and highly inclusive participation 
processes that take place during the drafting stage, compared to when 
participation takes place during debates over an already-drafted text or during 
ratification (Eisenstadt et al. 2015, 2017).
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Adding to this work is a growing body of scholarship on deliberative 
democracy and constitution-building. This body of research focuses on the role of 
citizen assembly bodies—such as mini-public random assemblies and deliberative 
polling—in facilitating informed citizen deliberation in a way that is normatively, 
instrumentally and substantively useful for constitution-making (e.g. Fishkin 
2003, 2009; Smith and Setäl 2018). Recent studies have shown that well- 
designed deliberative citizen bodies—for instance those that include participants 
who are descriptively representative of broader society, which provide unbiased 
learning and consultation opportunities, and which involve a degree of 
transparency—can also serve as trust proxies for the wider public, enabling 
average individuals to make better trust judgements about the proposed 
constitution or amendment without expending significant cognitive effort 
(Warren and Gastil 2015). Deliberative citizen bodies may thus be understood as 
contributing to the legitimacy of the resulting constitutional text (and perhaps to 
enhanced participatory governance) in ways that are distinct from other 
participation mechanisms, and may play different roles depending on when such 
bodies are used within a constitution-making process.
Process designers must therefore determine which  participatory mechanism(s) 
should be used, when participation will take place throughout the various stages 
of the constitution-building process, and how  participation feedback will 
influence (and constrain) both the content of the draft and the elite negotiation 
process to adopt the text. Moreover, designers must manage public expectations 
about what participation can realistically  achieve. Public consultation and broad 
public buy-in is not a substitute for political consensus among elite decision- 
makers, though it may shape elite calculations and bargaining dynamics. 
Moreover, not all widely held public opinions are necessarily appropriate to 
include in the final text. Such process design and management decisions are made 
within a country-specific ecosystem of constraints and opportunities shaped by 
the state’s  political and cultural history; security situation; demographics; 
traditional or customary structures and practices; access to human, financial and 
material resources; access to technical expertise; and a range of other factors. To 
complete this formative task in an optimal way, country-level decision-makers 
require comparative knowledge rooted in empirical evidence to inform the 
planning of public participation processes.
Public participation in The Gambia
The Republic of The Gambia is a West African nation of around 2 million people 
surrounded on three sides by Senegal. From 1994 to 2016, the country was 
governed as an authoritarian dictatorship in which civil society and the political 
opposition were oppressed, extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances were 
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prevalent, and state resources were treated as the personal property of the ruling 
elite (HRW 2019).
The Gambia’s 1997 Constitution, which remains in force, contains a number 
of provisions that support democratic governance. Over time, the document was 
amended under Yahya Jammeh’s  regime in ways that inter alia weakened 
accountability, granted broad immunity to the president and created institutional 
conflicts of interest (Jobarteh 2018; Constitutional Review Commission 2020). 
In practice, it did little to curb regime abuses over two decades and therefore 
enjoys limited popular legitimacy.
In 2016, in a surprising victory, a coalition of opposition parties headed by 
Adama Barrow won the presidential election—in part on a platform for 
constitutional reform, democratization and development (Helal 2017; Searcey 
and Barry 2017). Given the country’s history, the new constitutional text must 
enjoy popular legitimacy and demonstrate to the public both symbolically and 
functionally that the ‘new’  Gambia is more inclusive, participatory and 
democratic than the Gambia of Jammeh.
One may infer from contemporary public debates, official statements, and 
policy and planning materials that Gambian decision-makers and citizens alike 
recognized the importance of the participation process. The very decision to 
develop a new constitution (rather than amend the 1997 text) is both symbolic 
and functional. While aiming to provide an enhanced architecture for democratic 
governance, it also represents a break with the past. Gambians broadly accept the 
idea that a well-designed participation process can support the construction of a 
democratic constitutional text that meaningfully reflects the interests and desires 
of the Gambian people. There is also a strong belief that participation is 
important to build popular legitimacy for the new constitutional order, enhance 
people’s education and engagement in the country’s transition, facilitate trust and 
reconciliation across communities and between citizens and political leaders, and 
enlist a cadre of citizen guardians for the new constitution and Gambian 
democracy. Moreover, the process is seen as a test of the capacity and 
commitment of Barrow’s  government to meaningful ‘system  change’ (Jobarteh 
2018). The issue of public education and civic engagement is particularly 
important for process design because article 226 of the current Constitution 
requires a new constitution to be approved by 75 per cent of voters in a popular 
referendum, with a 50 per cent turnout threshold.
In 2017, following government-led consultations with key civil society groups 
and other stakeholders, the National Assembly enacted the Constitutional Review 
Commission (CRC) Act, which established the initial drafting body as an 
independent commission composed of 11 members appointed by the president. 
The law obligated the president to ensure that all individuals appointed to the 
commission are of high moral character and have appropriate qualifications, and 
to regard the ‘geographical,  professional, age and gender diversity of The 
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Gambia’ (CRC Act, article 4). The law’s provisions on the composition of the 
CRC may be understood as an attempt to ensure that the initial drafting body 
would be inclusive and non-partisan.
The law further obligated the CRC to ‘seek  public opinion and take into 
account such proposals as it considers appropriate’, and to afford Gambians both 
within and outside the country ‘the opportunity to freely express their opinions 
and make suggestions on matters they feel should be considered in the 
Constitution’ (article  6). It further empowered the CRC to publish the draft 
constitution and the body’s final report in a manner as the commission considers 
fit (article 21(3)).
Though the CRC was entirely appointed by the president, which may tend in 
some circumstances to undercut public trust in such a body, the selected 
commissioners were nationally known personalities who enjoyed broad pubic 
respect as being apolitical and credible authorities. In addition, civil society 
organizations were asked to nominate a member to be appointed by the president, 
which supported representation of this sector, and the body was gender balanced. 
The CRC’s composition therefore generated a high degree of public trust from 
the outset.
In subsequently designing the public participation process, CRC members 
surveyed comparative practice, assessed the Gambian context and legal history, 
consulted with international advisors, and accepted suggestions from key 
stakeholder organizations and individuals. Key among the commissioners’ 
concerns was ensuring that the participation process would be contextualized and 
appropriate within the framework of The Gambia’s cultural and social traditions, 
community structures, and local resources and expertise. It also needed to involve 
extensive civic education and ensure the inclusion and participation of women, 
youth, persons with disabilities, the elderly, rural dwellers and members of the 
diaspora. The role of youth is particularly important in the country’s transition; 
mobilized young people and youth organizations played a major role in electing 
the opposition coalition in 2016, and the movement remains active in the 
constitution-building, transitional justice and governance reform processes (e.g. 
Bah 2018). The CRC was well aware that their choice of participation 
mechanisms and sequencing of participation opportunities needed to effectively 
engage young people. Further, designers were aware of and concerned about 
methodological issues related to particular participation mechanisms, such as self- 
selection bias and potential access challenges.
With these aims in mind, the CRC designed a participation process that 
perhaps typifies a ‘good practice’ approach to participatory constitution-making 
according to extant understanding among scholars and practitioners alike. It 
involved quality assurance and monitoring and evaluation measures; the 
establishment of a specialized CRC website containing background information 
and links to legal materials,  planning documents and CRC reports in multiple 1
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local languages; and the use of a variety of participation opportunities and 
mechanisms to ensure broad inclusion.
The process began with broad civic education campaigns and the distribution 
of a constitutional ‘issues’  survey document in print and online across the 
country. Following this initial campaign (which continued through other 
institutional partners), the CRC and its teams across the country convened a 
series of community participation forums and targeted focus groups (e.g. with 
women, the disabled and youth). They also organized household surveys, one-on- 
one meetings and interviews, published online surveys and advertised 
opportunities to submit written proposals. Prior to engaging communities, the 
CRC held awareness meetings with local and traditional leaders to sensitize them 
to the constitution-building and participation processes and request their 
assistance in reaching local populations. Prior to and during the community- 
based and online survey processes, the CRC also accepted solicited and 
unsolicited position papers and recommendations from organizations and 
individuals. An initial text was then drafted and released to the public for further 
comment, along with an explanatory memorandum translated into five local 
languages. The CRC then revised the text and publicized the ‘final’ draft along 
with an explanatory memorandum, as well as the body’s report to the president. 
The publication of the CRC’s report was particularly important for transparency, 
as it detailed how the public consultations were carried out, the manner in which 
public opinion was addressed, coverage data and the challenges faced (CRC 
2020).
In total, the CRC received 107 formal position papers, held 106 in-country 
public consultations in a three-month period, and convened 263 focus groups 
with 7,890 people across the country. It also held external consultations with 
Gambian diaspora in nine countries, and face-to-face consultations with organs of 
the state, civil society, international organizations, interest groups and faith-based 
organizations plus some individuals. Public meetings involved 874 people and 
household surveys and were administered to 9,263 registered voters from among 
1.06 million. Over 1,300 people completed online surveys (CRC 2020).
The Gambia’s participation process was inclusive, consultative and substantial. 
For example, it involved multiple phases and mechanisms that enabled the CRC 
to systematically review feedback and incorporate findings into the draft and 
follow-up consultations. It also supported broad access through the use of 
multiple national languages and mixed outreach mechanisms, such as radio 
broadcasts, plays and concerts. Though the CRC’s report to the president notes 
challenges that influenced both the level of inclusion and the quality of 
participant feedback, these problems were reportedly minimal.
Yet participation opportunities were not evenly distributed throughout the 
various stages of constitution-making. There was limited public participation 
during the process design stage, when parliament and the government informally 
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consulted with civic groups prior to drafting the CRC Act. Public participation 
primarily centred around consultations to develop and deliberate the initial text 
and through (anticipated) voting in a ratification referendum. Moreover, it could 
be argued that the idea of facilitating trust and the notion of trust proxies was 
integrated throughout the process—both through the appointment of nationally 
known and trusted members to the CRC, which helped imbue the body with a 
high degree of trust, and through the CRC’s participation methodology, which 
incorporated local and traditional leaders as well as other trusted groups.
The normative and instrumental values of the public participation process were 
revealed in notable ways in The Gambia. For example, to the extent that the 
CRC’s process was intended to enlist a cadre of citizen guardians to safeguard the 
constitutional text and the process as a whole, and to build popular buy-in for the 
content of the CRC draft, its efforts were demonstrably successful in the lead-up 
to political deliberations. Following the CRC’s  submission of its draft to the 
president, citizens were concerned that the text would be altered prior to its 
publication in the National Gazette  as a bill for consideration by parliament (as 
required under article 101 of the 1997 Constitution). This concern was 
understandable given the country’s  history of dictatorship and disputes within 
President Barrow’s governing coalition that arose during the drafting process (e.g. 
van Eyssen 2019). Accordingly, activists and the media mobilized to demand that 
the draft be published without alteration by the executive. This illustrates both 
the degree to which civic space and freedom of speech have expanded in The 
Gambia since the 2017 transition, and popular sentiment about the draft 
constitution. Indeed, a majority of civil society organizations asserted that the text 
represents the opinion of the Gambian people. In its defence, they began 
monitoring the actions of the executive and legislature and demanding through 
the media that the Independent Electoral Commission hold a timely referendum 
(e.g. Jeffang 2020; Camara 2020; Jobarteh 2020).
In May 2020, President Barrow published the unaltered draft constitution as a 
parliamentary bill despite his concerns (and those of his allies) about key 
provisions. Since the Gambian constitution-building process uses a kind of relay 
approach, wherein the draft developed through a participatory process is handed 
over to a different body for subsequent political deliberations, contentious issues 
in the popularly supported draft needed to be resolved through political 
deliberations in the later parliamentary review process.
This is important because although the draft enjoys broad public support, a 
vocal and influential minority of Gambians suggested it should be rejected. 
Criticisms range from the political (relating to term limits and qualification 
provisions and their implications for President Barrow), to the normative (relating 
to suggestions that the draft ‘plagiarizes’  the Kenyan Constitution and does not 
reflect Gambian values), to the substantive (relating to provisions on 
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decentralization and self-governance, executive–legislative relations, fundamental 
rights, representation and the judiciary) (e.g. Darboe 2020; Colley 2020).
Perhaps as a result of these unresolved, politically contentious issues, the bill on 
the new constitution failed in its second parliamentary reading in September 
2020: it received 31 of the 42 votes required to move to it into committee for 
deliberation and potential revision. Despite this setback and the country’s 
political divisions, popular demands for a new constitution and public support for 
the draft remain strong. Political negotiations to resolve contentious issues in the 
draft remained ongoing at the time of writing.
Public participation in Mongolia
In November 2019, Mongolia enacted a series of significant amendments to its 
1992 Constitution. This process marked the culmination of a unique and 
innovative approach to participatory constitution-building through the use of 
deliberative polling.
Deliberative polling is a mechanism that provides insights into what the 
opinions of the broader public would theoretically be  if they had the opportunity 
to become more informed and engaged in constitutional issues (Center for 
Deliberative Democracy n.d.). It uses weighted random representative samples of 
the polity to comprise the deliberative assembly, making it methodologically 
complex and highly technical (Center for Deliberative Democracy n.d.; Fishkin 
and Luskin 2005). Like other citizen assemblies or ‘mini-publics’,  deliberative 
polling—depending on when it takes place and how the resulting 
recommendations are used—may also provide a kind of trust proxy for the wider 
public and contribute to the overall legitimacy of the process and the 
constitutional text (Warren and Gastil 2015). The Mongolian leadership 
understood the instrumental and normative assumptions about deliberative 
polling as a participation mechanism, and the importance of ensuring the 
effective representation of public views as part of the constitutional reform process 
(Knowles 2017; Naran 2019). Their choice of this mechanism illustrates their 
view of what participation can do, and also their access to necessary technical 
advice on the design and roll-out of the deliberative polling process (Martinovich 
2017).
The Mongolia case is particularly interesting for two main reasons: (1) the 
types of participation mechanisms used and (2) the way in which participation 
opportunities were sequenced at different stages of the constitution-building 
process. Decision-makers established several participation processes at the agenda- 
setting stage (including the use of deliberative polling) and continued to hold 
public consultations during later deliberations on the text (see Eisenstadt et al. 
2015, 2017). At one point there was a proposal to hold a ratification referendum, 
but this did not occur.
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Since the 1990s, Mongolia has become one of the region’s most important 
democracies. Its 1992 Constitution was promulgated in a highly participatory 
process during the transition from Soviet socialism to democracy and a free- 
market economy. The text embraces key democratic principles such as the rule of 
law, separation of powers and the protection of human rights. Mongolia is a 
different country today, however, than it was in 1992, and constitutional 
challenges have arisen.
Observers note that Mongolia’s  politics, like in much of the world, have 
become increasingly partisan. Some suggest that partisan influence has 
encroached on the independence of the civil service and judiciary, among other 
institutions, and that problems with corruption have not been sufficiently 
addressed. Moreover, Mongolia has faced challenges with government instability: 
it has had 14 prime ministers in 24 years (e.g. Bulag 2014; Ganbat 2007; 
Ginsburg and Ganzorig 2001; Naran 2019). Successive governments have 
struggled to identify and implement policy priorities and to maintain growth in 
the country’s extractive resource-based economy (Naran 2019). The Constitution 
was amended in 2000 through a process that was criticized for being far less 
participatory and inclusive than that undertaken in 1992. Subsequent attempts to 
amend in 2011, 2012 and 2015 were unsuccessful, and faced similar criticism for 
a lack of participation (Support to Participatory Legislative Process project 2016; 
Odonkhuu 2016, 2020).
Notably, as in The Gambia, Mongolia’s  participatory constitutional reform 
project was initiated by the new ruling party as part of a 2016 campaign promise 
rooted in public demands. In that election, the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) 
won 85 per cent of seats in parliament. According to article 68 of the 1992 
Constitution, a three-fourths legislative majority is needed to amend it, which 
gave the MPP unliteral power to change the constitution. However, the MPP 
upheld its campaign commitments, which indicates that both the political 
leadership and the public understood that public participation was both necessary 
and foundational to the desired constitutional, societal and political 
transformation (Naran 2019).
In 2016, as part of the amendment planning stage, parliament established two 
working groups comprised of constitutional scholars and other experts to study 
the need for constitutional amendment and to conduct public consultations. 
Using primarily conventional methods such as town hall events and meetings, the 
working groups consulted with over 3,000 citizens and developed a series of 
recommendations for parliament and the government on issues for constitutional 
reform.
In 2017, following a successful pilot on policy planning for the capital city of 
Ulaanbaatar, parliament enacted the Law on Deliberative Polling and amended 
the 2010 Law on Constitutional Amendment Procedure to require that the 
process be conducted prior to amending the constitution (as well as for other 
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specified development planning). After passing the law, parliament enacted a 
resolution for a deliberative polling process that included a list of six 
constitutional topics for deliberation. These were reportedly determined by the 
MPP but were based on the results of the working groups’  research and public 
consultations (Naran 2019; Odonkhuu 2017). The resolution established a 
Deliberative Council charged with administering the polling, developing opinion 
questionnaires and balanced briefing materials, nominating experts and 
developing recommendations for constitutional amendment for parliament 
(Odonkhuu 2017). Parliament would consider these recommendations during 
the initial drafting phase, which was performed by a limited-membership working 
group. It is notable, though fairly common, that the results of the deliberative 
polling were not binding on the Deliberative Council; nor were the 
recommendations of the Deliberative Council binding on parliament when it 
drafted the initial text. It is worth noting that the conclusions and 
recommendations of citizen assemblies and similar deliberation bodies are not 
often binding on political institutions. Exceptions include the Citizens’ 
Assemblies on Electoral Reform in British Colombia (2004) and Ontario (2007). 
In Mongolia, some of the polling results were supported in the Deliberative 
Council’s final recommendations, while others were rejected (Odonkhuu 2017).
Mongolia’s participation process also included further opportunities for public 
comment on the draft constitutional text during the later phases. Like in The 
Gambia, decision-makers used a variety of participation mechanisms to ensure 
broad and representative inclusion. This included, for example, publishing the 
initial draft (and subsequent revisions) online to inform the public of the content 
and allow comparison against deliberative polling recommendations, establishing 
an open period for written and online feedback on the various drafts, and 
convening multiple consultation meetings with citizens and key organizations. 
Though there is limited evidence that participation mechanisms used during this 
phase expressly targeted women, youth or other marginalized groups as they did 
in The Gambia, members of parliament did consult their local constituencies 
following the first reading of the amendment bill. The at-large processes reached 
over 327,000 Mongolians, while the constituency consultations reached over 
40,000 (Odonkhuu 2020).
Public participation played less of a role in the final stage of the constitution- 
making process. As noted above, decision-makers opted not to hold a ratification 
referendum on the proposed amendments, though such referendums are 
permissible under the 1992 Constitution (article 68). As the governing party, and 
to enhance legitimacy, the MPP used its supermajority to pass a referendum 
resolution. The move was opposed by the opposition, however, and ultimately 
vetoed by the president for other reasons. The referendum debate, along with a 
series of substantive political disagreements over the content of the amendments, 
was finally resolved through a multiparty negotiation process that involved the 
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executive branch (Odonkhuu 2020). Such last-minute negotiations and revisions 
are not uncommon, but there is a risk that they may undercut the potential 
benefits of public participation with regard to the popular legitimacy of the 
ratified text.
Mongolia’s combination of deliberative polling during the agenda-setting phase 
and multiple other participation opportunities and mechanisms at later stages of 
the process might reasonably be categorized as broadly participatory, but also 
somewhat limited. Arguably, all segments of the population were able to 
participate at some stage of the reform process, and those who wanted to, did so. 
It is not clear, however, how inclusive participation was, or whether (or how) 
public feedback impacted the content of amendment provisions over several 
drafts. The political deliberation and bargaining process that took place in the 
weeks prior to adoption reveal that public opinion may have played less of a 
substantive role, in practice, in setting the agenda and determining the content of 
the text than may otherwise be supposed, and more of an instrumental role in 
influencing elite negotiations. For example, while deliberative polling and the use 
of broad participation opportunities throughout the process likely supported 
public trust and legitimacy—which is crucial for constitution-building—the 
potential use of a ratification referendum (rather than public consultation 
feedback on the draft itself) appears to have been an important bargaining chip in 
negotiations between the MPP, the opposition and the president to resolve 
contentious issues and ultimately build consensus on the final text.
The Mongolia case demonstrates that attempts to categorize a country’s 
participation process as a whole are likely to be misleading. Mongolia, like many 
other countries, employed different participation types at different stages of the 
constitution-building process to achieve different normative, instrumental and 
substantive objectives. The use and sequencing of deliberative polling and public 
consultations in the agenda-setting and drafting and deliberation stages, and the 
threat of a ratification referendum during elite deliberations in particular, raise 
interesting questions about how we systematically understand the relationships 
between particular participation mechanisms and levels of inclusion, the timing of 
participation opportunities at different stages of the process, elite bargaining, and 
outcomes for legitimacy and democracy.
Concluding remarks
In contemporary constitution-building, the role of the public has expanded 
significantly, as have expectations and assumptions about what pubic 
participation processes can achieve. Today, the public generally expects to be 
consulted in some way in processes to reframe the state, reform the governance 
dispensation, and redistribute political power and resources. Given the high stakes 
of the constitutional reform process, and the normative and legal right  to 
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participate in the conduct of public affairs, this is understandable. However, the 
gap between what we assume public participation can  do (and how  this is 
accomplished), and systematic empirical support in the literature, is troubling. 
Further information and comparative, practical guidance is crucial to support 
decision-makers at the country level to make more informed choices when 
designing their participation process, sequencing participation opportunities and 
constructing participatory mechanisms.
This cursory review of The Gambia and Mongolia cases highlights the 
interactions between various constraints, interests, passions, reasons and 
assumptions as they pertain to the design of participation processes. These cases 
demonstrate that motivated decision-makers do sometimes buy in to the 
presumed instrumental, normative and substantive benefits of participatory 
constitution-making, and seek to design processes in a way that can optimize their 
overarching and specific objectives as they relate to the various stages of 
constitution-making and the constitution-building process as a whole. 
Practitioners therefore require a better understanding of how to get the most out 
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1. The CRC website contains downloadable documents shared with the public, 
including the initial and revised draft constitutional texts, explanatory 
memoranda and the final report, among others. It is accessible at <https:// 
crc220.org/>.
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Autonomous institutions and 




This chapter examines recent constitutional developments in two jurisdictions 
that were both in the process of transitioning to greater autonomy in 2019: 
Tobago (in Trinidad and Tobago) under the Constitution Amendment (Tobago 
Self-Government) Bill of 2018 and Bangsamoro (in the Philippines) under the 
Bangsamoro Organic Law (Republic Act 11054).
This chapter does not focus on the degree of autonomy, or on the factors that 
led to the desire for greater self-rule, but on the innovative governance 
arrangements proposed or designed for Tobago and Bangsamoro. Plans for 
Tobago include a novel form of second chamber, the ‘House  of the People’, 
which would comprise elected representatives of socio-economic ‘sectors’. 
Bangsamoro, in a country with a long tradition of presidential government, has 
chosen a quasi-parliamentary system for its regional institutions. What is on the 
table in Tobago and Bangsamoro is not merely a transfer of the geographical 
location of power, but a change in the way that power is exercised. These 
deviations from the ‘parent constitution’ are perhaps unexpected and are worthy 
of some attention.
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Constitutional replication, reform and rejection
Constitutions rarely emerge in a vacuum. They are shaped by ideas, institutions 
and interests interacting in a particular social, economic and political context. 
Where a new constitution is adopted, inertia and path dependency often 
determine the range of available constitutional choices (Negretto 2013). In the 
transmission of constitutional designs from one constitution to another—from 
‘ancestor’ to ‘descendant’ constitutions—proverbial apples do not fall far from the 
tree and new chips tend to resemble the old block.
This may occur in the transmission of national-level constitutions over time, 
even after major political ruptures; new constitutions often resemble the old one 
they have replaced (Varol 2016). It may occur in the process of ‘migration  of 
constitutional ideas’  from one country to another (Choudhry 2008), especially 
where the second country is a former colony or dependency of the first. For 
instance, the similarity of ‘Westminster  Model’  constitutions to the British 
archetype has been well documented (Dale 1993; de Smith 1964). Even if there is 
no colonial connection, borrowing may occur from ‘prestige’ constitutions which, 
in their place and time, have a good reputation, to countries seeking to emulate 
them. For example, in the 19th century, the US Constitution was widely copied 
in Latin America (Gargarella 2014), while the Belgian Constitution was copied in 
places such as Romania (Parau 2013: 507–09).
There are many deviations from the default of constitutional replication. First, 
where constitutional replication must adjust to different contexts, allegiance to 
familiar institutions is strong, but the circumstances dictate a process of 
adaptation rather than mere adoption. For example, when the Westminster 
Model was exported to diverse societies that required federalism or other 
guarantees for minorities (see de Smith 1964: 106–09), the aim was still to 
preserve, in the words of the preamble to Canada’s Constitution Act 1867, ‘a 
form of government similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom’. Doing 
so within the context required rearranging those forms to accommodate 
territorial, linguistic and religious differences.
A second cause of change is deliberate reform, which entails changes that go 
beyond the minimum necessary rearrangements to fit the context, but which 
nevertheless build upon the familiar system and do not reject its basic premises. 
Such reforms may occur when political pressures lead to reforms that might have 
been long advocated in the ‘ancestor’ constitutional order, but which cannot be 
achieved there for political reasons. For example, article 77 of Syria’s  1930 
Constitution enabled the president to dissolve Parliament on the advice of the 
Council of Ministers. This altered a rule against dissolution found in the 
Constitution of the French Third Republic (the ancestor of the 1930 Syrian 
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Constitution) that was widely believed to have made French governments fragile 
and unstable, but which in France had not been feasible to amend (Gooch 1935).
Third, a new constitution can reject its predecessor. This may occur when one 
‘godfather’  constitution is replaced by another—in a sense, a country’s 
constitutional order is ‘adopted’ from one constitutional ‘family’ to another. For 
example, the Romanian Constitution of 1923 and the Bulgarian Constitution of 
1879 were closely modelled on the then-prestigious Constitution of Belgium, 
while the Romanian Constitution of 1948 and the Bulgarian Constitution of 
1947 exhibited Soviet influence. These constitutional orders thereby ceased to 
belong to the family of liberal European constitutional monarchies and became 
members of the Soviet family. A previous constitutional order might also be 
rejected due to internal political changes—such as a desire for a more 
autochthonous constitution that rejects a colonial heritage of foreign influence, or 
a recognition that the existing constitution has failed and needs replacement.
Decisions on deviation from the familiar constitutional order have implications 
for the design of autonomous subnational institutions. When a new subnational 
institution is being created, the national constitution can be regarded as the 
‘ancestor’  constitution and the instrument creating autonomous regional 
institutions as the ‘descendant’  constitution. The political systems of federal or 
devolved countries often display predictable parallels between the two major levels 
of government: if the federal level is presidential, then the state level is likely to be 
so too, with directly elected state governors; if the federal level is parliamentary, 
then the state level is likewise generally parliamentary. Although there are rare 
exceptions, such as the quasi-federal regionalist system in Italy, where a country 
that is parliamentary at the national level has directly elected regional governors 
(presidents of regional governments), the large democratic federations—such as 
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, India, Malaysia, Nigeria and the 
United States—all conform to this pattern of parallels. That the new institutions 
for Tobago and Bangsamoro differ in greater or lesser ways from the mere 
replication of national-level institutions is therefore worthy of analysis. Are these 
cases examples of reform or rejection of ‘ancestor’ constitutional models?
Tobago
Context and background
When the British gained control of Tobago after the 1762 Treaty of Paris, they 
established a bicameral legislature, in the typical style of British plantation 
colonies, consisting of a House of Assembly elected on a restricted (white, male, 
property owning) franchise and a nominated Legislative Council. This was 
replaced in 1874 with a unicameral legislature consisting of six nominated and 
eight elected members, which in turn was replaced in 1876 by direct rule by the 
governor (O’Brien  and Gayle 2018). In 1889, Tobago was united with 
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neighbouring Trinidad and lost its self-governing status, although it continued to 
have its own financial board and treasury administered by a resident 
commissioner who was an ex officio member of the Trinidad Legislative Council 
(Rowley 2018).
When Trinidad and Tobago became independent in 1962, Tobago continued 
to be incorporated into a unitary state without distinct representative institutions. 
Nevertheless, ‘There was an acceptance that Tobago is a distinct community with 
a history and life of its own and must not be regarded as a mere appendage of 
Trinidad’ (Rowley  2018). Demands for Tobago self-government were first 
effectively voiced in 1977 by A. N. R. Robinson, Member of Parliament (MP) for 
Tobago East (O’Brien and Gayle 2018).
Proposals for Tobago autonomy circulating in the late 1970s led to the 
enactment of the Tobago House of Assembly Act 1980. The assembly’s powers 
were limited to formulating and implementing policy on matters referred to it by 
a government minister. It was responsible for implementing national policy in 
Tobago relating to functions including economic planning, programming and 
development of resources, infrastructure and finance. It had a limited scope to 
make by-laws for the proper management of facilities it operated (Rowley 2018).
Although the Tobago House of Assembly was originally a statutory body, it 
was given constitutional recognition in 1996 (Constitution Amendment Act 
1996). At the same time, but by ordinary law (Tobago House of Assembly Act 
1996), its powers were somewhat expanded to include the power to propose bills 
that, if approved by the assembly, would be transmitted to the secretary to the 
Cabinet and, subject to Cabinet approval, would be submitted to the Parliament 
of Trinidad and Tobago for enactment into law (Tobago House of Assembly Act 
1996: section 29). However, in 30 years no such ‘Assembly  laws’  have been 
enacted (Rowley 2018). In other words, in practice Tobago has only an 
administrative, rather than legislative, form of devolution.
Recent developments
The current chapter in the constitutional reform process began with the election, 
in 2015, of a People’s National Movement (PNM) government for Trinidad and 
Tobago led by Dr Keith Rowley, himself a Tobagonian (O’Brien  and Gayle 
2018). An initial bill proposed in 2016 stalled, but a revised bill to amend the 
Constitution (Constitution Amendment (Tobago Self-Government) Bill 2018) 
was introduced into the Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago on 9 March 2018 
and passed on its first reading. The bill was referred to a Joint Select Committee, 
which was to report by 31 July 2019. However, progress on the bill has been 
slow; it was not reported out of committee until late December 2019. In early 
2020 it was further delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic and the bill lapsed at 
the dissolution of Parliament on 3 July 2020. Following the general election held 
on 10 August 2020, which saw the PNM returned to power with a slightly 
International IDEA  59
4. Replicate, reform or reject? Autonomous institutions and constitutional innovation in Tobago and 
Bangsamoro
reduced majority, the bill—now known as the Constitution (Amendment) 
(Tobago Self-Government) Bill 2020—was reintroduced to the House of 
Representatives. It received its first reading in October 2020 and was referred to a 
joint committee due to report by 31 December 2020. As such, progress on the 
bill continues, although having been interrupted by the dissolution and general 
election, it is no nearer to the end of the legislative process.
Constitutional innovations
If passed, the constitutional amendment would vastly increase Tobago’s 
autonomy and reinforce the degree of constitutional protection given to that 
autonomy. It would transform the basis of Tobago’s  self-government from a 
devolved administrative arrangement to one that is genuinely (if asymmetrically) 
federal: it would have two levels of government, each established by the 
constitution and each with constitutionally entrenched powers. Tobago’s 
legislature would have authority over the ‘peace, order and good government of 
Tobago’ except in relation to a list of 11 scheduled matters, principally including 
civil aviation, immigration, foreign affairs, judiciary and national governmental 
institutions, meteorology and national security (but not policing).
This chapter focuses on the proposed changes to the institutions of self- 
government, rather than their powers or constitutional status. The Tobago House 
of Assembly is currently a unicameral body consisting of 12 elected members and 
four nominated members (three chosen on the advice of the chief secretary and 
one on the advice of the minority leader), plus a presiding officer who may be 
chosen from outside the House of Assembly (Tobago House of Assembly n.d.). 
The bill would replace this with a bicameral Tobago Legislature. The House of 
Assembly would become the lower house, and a new upper house, the People’s 
House, would be created.
The powers of the proposed People’s House mirror those of the Trinidad and 
Tobago Senate. It would have the right to scrutinize bills and propose 
amendments, and have a suspensory veto over bills other than money bills— 
although the veto period allowed to the People’s House would be three months, 
as opposed to six months for the Senate of Trinidad and Tobago (Constitution of 
Trinidad and Tobago, section 64; Constitutional Amendment (Tobago Self- 
Government) Bill 2018, section18).
The bill stipulates that the People’s House would consist of 13 members. Seven 
would be elected by the people from geographical constituencies corresponding to 
Tobago’s  seven parishes—making the House of Assembly the only partially 
directly elected second chamber in the Commonwealth Caribbean. The 
remaining six members would be elected from ‘sectoral’  constituencies— 
commercial and business, tourism, agriculture, environment, services and legal— 
through a list of recognized organizations, the details of which will be determined 
by subsequent legislation.
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The inclusion of independent members representing various aspects of civil 
society is not novel. It is a form of ‘functional’  or ‘vocational’  representation, 
reflecting the idea that representation should be concerned not only with party 
labels or programmatic policy goals, but with the inclusion of diverse forms of 
expertise, experience and socio-economic interests. Examples of second chambers 
based on functional representation include the Irish Senate, the National Council 
of Slovenia and the former Senate—abolished in 1999—of the German State of 
Bavaria.
Already in Trinidad and Tobago, nine senators (29 per cent of the total) are 
currently appointed at the president’s  discretion among ‘outstanding  persons 
from economic or social or community organizations and other major fields of 
endeavour’ (Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, section 40). This is a common 
feature in Commonwealth Caribbean second chambers (O’Brien  2014), which 
are criticized as lacking democratic legitimacy. The link between the social, 
cultural and economic interests ostensibly being represented and the individuals 
appointed to office is opaque and sometimes tenuous. There is broad scope for 
discretion, and potential for the abuse of power and political patronage. In 
practice, appointed Senates in the Caribbean have only marginal value; debates 
about their reform or abolition continue (O’Brien 2014).
Election by sectoral constituencies is an attempt to preserve the functional 
representation of interests while overcoming the problems associated with 
appointments. It transfers the element of discretion from the president to the 
sectoral organizations, which will presumably want to further their sectoral 
interests above those of a particular party. This approach also ensures that 
balanced sectorial interests are represented: it would not be possible under the 
proposed system for Tobago to appoint two representatives from the agricultural 
sector and none from tourism; both are entitled to have a voice.
Nevertheless, election by sectoral constituencies is not immune to 
manipulation. The proposed constitutional amendment would allow Parliament 
to determine the list of bodies authorized to participate in the election, the 
manner of voting and the weighting of votes. To list is to choose, and incumbent 
governing majorities could manipulate these lists to include or exclude particular 
groups. Political patronage may therefore still operate in a way that is indirect and 
paradoxically less transparent. Specifying the list of organizations in the 
constitution would be more resistant to manipulation but would be unworkable 
in practice: constitutions are hard to change, but civil society organizations are 
constantly in flux.
Functional representation provides for the inclusion of socio-economic elites 
through certain recognized civil society organizations but does not include 
ordinary members of the public. This raises a normative question of whether 
functional representation is legitimate on democratic grounds: why should 
powerful vested interests, which presumably can make their voices effectively 
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heard in elective politics, have guaranteed seats in the People’s House? This is 
particularly the case in a small community like Tobago, where the political and 
socio-economic elites are small and overlapping. That question cannot be 
answered conclusively here, but it is important to note that the proposed People’s 
House—despite the name and the inclusion of a directly elected element—is not 
an exclusively popular assembly. It is instead a continuation, formalization and 
modification of the elite, interest-based representation that has long been a feature 
of Caribbean second chambers.
This proposal for Tobago can therefore be regarded as an example of 
constitutional reform, rather than replication or rejection. The specific 
mechanism of selection is innovative, but the principle on which it rests—that of 
a second chamber that acts as a House of Review, bringing experience, expertise 
and societal interests to bear on legislation—is conservative.
Bangsamoro
Context and background
The Bangsamoro region in Mindanao, southern Philippines, was the scene of a 
violent conflict between the armed forces of the Philippines and guerrilla forces 
supporting self-government for the Muslim (‘Moro’)  community of Mindanao. 
The dispute between the Moro people and the Philippine Government has many 
causes—from grievances over the status of customary law and land tenures to lack 
of development and economic opportunities. According to the Philippine 
Government’s  Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process, ‘the 
Muslim-dominated provinces in Mindanao are among the poorest provinces in 
the country with per capita incomes and human development indices below the 
national average’ (Government of the Philippines n.d.). However, the dispute is 
also one of identity, arising from tensions between a Muslim enclave and a largely 
Catholic country. As one leading Bangsamoro politician explained, under 
condition of anonymity, ‘We  are Moros [‘Moors’]  and the Moros have been 
fighting against the Spanish for a thousand years.’ To his mind, this was a conflict 
whose origins could be traced back to—and indeed far beyond—the earliest days 
of Spanish colonization.
The very long-running process has involved various political groupings and 
their military wings with different aims at different times. The Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) was willing to accept a degree of autonomy within the 
Philippines. After the fall of Ferdinand Marcos’  authoritarian regime and the 
adoption of a new constitution in 1987, attempts to accommodate this demand 
led to the creation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in 
1989 (Republic Act 6734). Another agreement reached between the Government 
of the Philippines and the MNLF in 1996 resulted, in 2001, in an expansion of 
the powers of the ARMM institutions (Republic Act 9054). The rival Moro 
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Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), initially a more hard-line offspring of the 
MNLF, nevertheless continued to insist on full independence as an Islamic state 
until after the death of its former leader Salamat Hashim. Only in 2010, at peace 
talks in Kuala Lumpur, did Mohagher Iqbal, the chief negotiator for MILF, 
finally renounce independence and express a willingness to accept an 
asymmetrical autonomy arrangement (Marcelo 2018; Digal 2010).
Recent developments
President Rodrigo Duterte, elected in 2016, is the first president to come from 
the Mindanao region. Determined to find a lasting resolution to the Bangsamoro 
problem, he almost immediately launched a discussion of federal proposals to 
reform the Philippine Constitution. However, this process of federal reform has 
stalled, in part due to concerns that federalism would worsen already problematic 
aspects of the country’s political system: namely, its oligarchic nature, dominance 
of the state by locally entrenched political dynasties, the weakness of political 
parties, the pervasiveness of corrupt clientelist relations between political bosses 
and citizens, and the consequent lack of coherent policymaking and 
programmatic accountability.
It was clear from the outset that the form of autonomy envisaged for the 
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region must go beyond that provided by the existing 
ARMM. Although they arose from the peace process, the laws establishing and 
conferring additional powers on the ARMM authorities (Republic Act 9054) did 
not fully involve Moro leaders in their drafting (Casauay 2015); the ARMM was 
therefore widely regarded as ‘a  failure, marred by corruption and 
mismanagement’ (Marcelo 2018).
While the previous president, Benigno Simeon Aquino III, signed the 
Bangsamoro Framework Agreement on 15 October 2012, it was not until March 
2014 that the final Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro was signed. 
However, Congress did not ratify the resulting Bangsamoro Basic Law that was to 
constitute the legal framework under which the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region 
was to govern itself before Duterte was elected president. Under pressure to reach 
a solution in Mindanao but with the path to federalism blocked, Duterte pursued 
a bespoke autonomy arrangement for Bangsamoro in the form of a Bangsamoro 
Organic Act that critically amended the draft Bangsamoro Basic Law.
In early 2019, a two-part plebiscite was held in Western Mindanao. In the first 
round, held on 21 January, voters in the territory of ARMM were asked whether 
they wished to accept the new Bangsamoro Organic Act (BOA). Although the 
BOA is merely an act of the legislature of the Philippines, and not a fully-fledged 
constitution, endorsement by referendum gives it ‘super-statute’ (Eskridge  and 
Ferejohn 2001) status. The BOA functions, in effect, as the autonomous regional 
constitution for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao 
(BARMM), setting out the principles on which the autonomous region is based 
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and the structures of its government. On 6 February, polls were held in the 
districts Lanao del Norte and Cotabato to determine whether they should be 
included in the autonomous jurisdiction. Their ascent enlarged the geographic 
area included in the BARMM, which is now larger than the former ARMM.
The new regional government, with Cotabato as its capital, was initially 
inaugurated on 29 March 2019 under the Bangsamoro Transition Authority 
(BTA). The BTA, a transitional unelected body consisting of 80 members, brings 
together the political leadership and former guerrilla fighters of the MNLF. The 
BTA combines legislative and executive functions for the autonomous region, but 
its primary duty is to complete the establishment of the new autonomous 
administration and prepare for elections.
Constitutional innovations
Three constitutional innovations in BARMM are notable. First, despite the 
Philippines’  long experience of presidentialism, the BOA provides for a quasi- 
parliamentary system in Bangsamoro—a wali  (governor) who acts as the 
ceremonial and constitutional head of Bangsamoro, and a chief minister (elected 
by the Parliament of Bangsamoro) to exercise executive power. This arrangement 
is considered quasi-parliamentary because the chief minister can only be removed 
during the term of office for which he or she is elected by a two-thirds majority 
vote in Parliament. Therefore the normal rule of parliamentary confidence, which 
would require a chief minister to resign, or seek a dissolution, if a majority of 
MPs withdrew their support, does not apply. In part, the requirement for a two- 
thirds majority to remove the chief minister was a deliberate attempt to ensure 
executive stability, but it may also demonstrate a degree of confusion or 
misunderstanding of how parliamentarism works. The executive’s dominance is 
further reinforced by the rule that a vote of no confidence automatically leads to 
the dissolution of Parliament, meaning that parliamentarians who cast a ballot in 
such a vote risk losing their seat (BOA, article VII, section 36).
Second, the BOA provides for the establishment of a Council of Leaders, 
consisting of the members of the Congress of the Philippines from Bangsamoro, 
provincial governors and mayors of cities in Bangsamoro, and representatives of 
traditional leaders and non-Moro indigenous communities. This innovative 
institution, unparalleled in the country’s history, acts as an advisory body to the 
chief minister and has a coordinating role, reaching ‘up’ to the national level and 
‘down’ to local levels and into indigenous communities. It reflects a concern not 
only for increased autonomy for Bangsamoro, but also for better-quality 
governance through improved cooperation between different levels of 
government.
Third, the Parliament of Bangsamoro is to be elected via a hybrid electoral 
system in which half of the seats are filled by proportional representation, 40 per 
cent elected from single-member districts, and 10 per cent reserved for women, 
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youth, traditional leaders, Ulama  (Muslim scholars), non-Moro indigenous 
peoples and settler communities. The provision for sectoral representation is 
shared with the national Congress of the Philippines, where 59 of the 297 seats 
are chosen from national party lists representing indigenous peoples and other 
minorities (IPU 2016). However, the shift to having half the seats proportionally 
elected is an innovation. In addition, the BOA contains a very strong anti- 
defection provision that makes MPs entirely dependent on their party machines: a 
party’s leadership may, without any procedural or substantive restrictions, remove 
any MP who has been elected on a party list and replace him or her with another 
party member (BOA, article VII, section 19).
Based on the author’s  discussions with leading members of the BTA in 
December 2019, there are two sets of reasons for the change in the system of 
government. The first relates to questions of governance and development. 
Bangsamoro leaders regard the Constitution of the Philippines as dysfunctional 
because it has sustained a political system characterized by weak, personalized 
parties, dynastic politics, lack of programmatic accountability and widespread 
corruption. The adoption of a parliamentary system—or something very close to 
it—in Bangsamoro was intended to address these weaknesses. The institutions, 
from the tenure of the chief minister to the electoral system and the strong anti- 
defection rules, are all designed to encourage effective but inclusive governance 
based on the united leadership of a chief minister heading a programmatic party 
or coalition.
The second set of reasons are symbolic and identitarian. The Moro leadership 
sought the establishment of the office of wali  to provide moral and civic 
leadership and to act as a focus of identity. The wali provides a symbolic 
institutional connection to the former Sultanate of Sula and reflects the Islamic 
character of the people. There are parallels between the office of wali and that of 
the Yang di-Pertua Negeri—who combines the functions of a constitutional head 
of state with those of a state religious head—in Malay states.
There are ongoing personal, cultural and economic links with Malaysia, 
especially to the states of Sabah and Sarawak. Bangsamoro elites have seen the 
parliamentary system working well in Malaysia to deliver both stable governance 
and economic development. Bangsamoro’s  leaders perceive Malaysia’s 
constitution as prestigious and worthy of emulation. Taken together, recent 
changes in Bangsamoro amount to a rejection, rather than merely reform, of the 
institutional arrangements of the Philippines—and also of the former ARMM. 
They represent a shift in the constitutional frame of reference away from the 
Philippines towards Malaysia.
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Concluding remarks
This chapter does not seek to provide a comprehensive answer to the question of 
how (or why) constitutions change. It simply isolates two cases of constitutional 
change on the agenda in 2019, both of which relate to regional autonomy, to 
examine how the ‘descendant’ institutions replicate, reform or reject those of their 
‘ancestor’ constitution.
Tobago exhibits reform—the introduction of an elected element combined 
with a change in how non-partisan members of a Commonwealth Caribbean 
second chamber are selected. Yet there is no fundamental change to the principle 
or logic of representation. The members directly elected from the parishes are 
likely, in the absence of proportional representation, to perpetuate existing 
patterns of two-party majoritarian politics, while the sectoral members of the 
People’s  House will continue to represent the ‘great  and good’.  The rest of 
Tobago’s  institutional design is closely comparable to other Commonwealth 
Caribbean governance institutions, making necessary allowances for the federal 
system. There is constitutional evolution only within a fairly narrow, well-worn 
path. Bangsamoro’s  changes are more radical, rejecting one ‘ancestor’ 
constitutional order in favour of another, both for identitarian reasons and in 
hopes of achieving better governance. At the same time, the BOA highlights the 
limits of constitutional rejection. The rules, conventions and norms of 
parliamentary government found in Malaysia, which ultimately descend from the 
Westminster Model, are absent in Bangsamoro—which continues to be 
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5. Contested state structures: comparing 
negotiations about federal system design 
in Myanmar and South Sudan
Thibaut Noel
Introduction
In countries where the state structure is contested, grievances frequently revolve 
around access to public power. In these contexts, establishing a federal system is 
sometimes seen as a viable solution not only to redefine access to public power 
and resources among different groups across the country, but also to address 
demands for autonomy and recognition of identity.
Federalism is a constitutional mechanism for dividing responsibilities between 
at least two levels of government in a country. It combines elements of self-rule 
and shared rule (Elazar 1987; Mueller 2017). Self-rule refers to the level of 
autonomy granted to the subnational governments to regulate certain policy 
areas. Shared rule implies the participation of subnational units in the conduct of 
public affairs at the federal level. The federal scheme is entrenched in the 
constitution and can only be altered with the consent of the federal level and the 
subnational units.
Given its potential to satisfy demands for increased power sharing while 
maintaining the country’s  territorial integrity, federalism has been hailed as a 
relevant tool for conflict resolution (Anderson and Keil 2017; Keil 2012). A 
federal scheme can help redefine power sharing by granting control to different 
territorially concentrated groups over specified policy matters (self-rule), and by 
ensuring their participation in decision-making at the federal level (shared rule).
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In the past 30 years, several countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995) 
and Nepal (2015), have established a federal state structure in an effort to resolve 
internal conflicts rooted in demands for increased access to power. Myanmar, 
South Sudan and Somalia are currently considering doing so.
While warring parties may agree on the importance of federalism at an early 
stage of a political settlement, negotiations over the design of a future federal 
system can be long and challenging. In Nepal, for example, despite a 
commitment to federalism from all major political forces in 2006, nine years of 
protracted negotiations were necessary for stakeholders to agree on its design.
This chapter provides a comparative overview of how the negotiations over the 
design of a future federal state structure unfolded in 2019 in Myanmar and South 
Sudan; both are currently engaged in a federalization process as an explicit 
commitment in a peace process. It analyses the competing interests shaping the 
negotiations on federalism and identifies the federal design elements that have 
been discussed in detail and those that still deserve more attention.
Negotiations about federal design in Myanmar
The quest for federalism in Myanmar dates back to the pre-independence era. In 
1947, representatives of the Bamar community and three ethnic minority groups 
agreed to form a state after independence, in which autonomy, the right to 
secession and representation of the main ethnic groups in national-level 
institutions would be guaranteed (Awng, Khine and Aung 2019; Kipgen 2018). 
However, the centralized system of government established after independence 
did not fulfil this pledge (Crouch 2019; Williams 2009). When ethnic minorities 
pushed for federalism, the military staged a coup d’état  in 1962 that led to four 
decades of centralized military rule. Since then, more than 20 ethnic armed 
organizations have taken up arms against the government in a quest for a genuine 
federal system.
Myanmar’s current Constitution, adopted in 2008 by the military, is contested 
(Government of Myanmar 2008). It sets up a hybrid system that guarantees the 
military control over three key ministries (defence, border affairs and home 
affairs), at least 25 per cent of the seats in parliament at both union and state/ 
region level, and accordingly a veto over constitutional amendments. The 2008 
Constitution also introduced limited federal features. On the one hand, it 
establishes two levels of government: the union level, and the subnational level 
consisting of seven Bamar-majority regions and seven ethnic states. Most of the 
legislative responsibilities, however, are granted to the union level. On the other 
hand, all regions and states are equally represented in the upper house of the 
union parliament, but they have a limited influence on federal policies as the 
upper chamber does not have the power to veto legislation. Further, the union 
president appoints the chief executives in states and regions (chief ministers); 
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therefore there is no direct electoral link between the state/region governments 
and their citizens.
Stalled negotiations in the peace process
In October 2015 the government, the military and eight ethnic armed 
organizations signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), which was a 
significant milestone towards sustainable peace (UN Peacemaker 2015). The 
agreement includes a commitment to establish a democratic federal system and 
lays out the process for negotiating the future state structure. Through a series of 
peace conferences, representatives from the government, the military, political 
parties and signatory armed groups (NCA Ethnic Armed Organizations) were to 
negotiate guiding principles for restructuring the system of government. The 
outcome of these negotiations would form the basis for amending the 2008 
charter.
Constitutional reforms and federalization gained further momentum with the 
landslide victory of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in the general 
elections in October 2015. The party came to power promising to amend the 
2008 Constitution, and the new NLD-led government initially prioritized the 
peace process as an avenue for constitutional change. Up to the third peace 
conference held in July 2018, 51 broad federal and governance principles were 
agreed upon. However, the process stalled in 2019. The political dialogue was 
stuck on key questions of access to power, autonomy and self-determination. In 
addition, about half of the ethnic armed groups, including those that de facto 
control the largest territorial areas, still refuse to sign the NCA and join the 
negotiations. A fourth peace conference was held in August 2020, but mostly 
focused on a plan to continue the peace process after the November 2020 
elections.
At least two reasons may have contributed to the deadlock. First, the large 
number of issues on the agenda, and the lack of systematic priority-setting, has 
prevented the negotiating parties from engaging in in-depth discussions about key 
governance reform topics. Second, negotiations on the design of the future federal 
system primarily focused on elements of self-rule and started on highly divisive 
topics such as the right to self-determination and substate constitutions. As a 
result, no significant agreements on fundamental principles for institutional 
reforms were reached during any of the four peace conferences. The principles 
agreed upon either reiterate commitments that were already provided in the NCA 
or are too vague to provide a sufficiently clear framework for designing the future 
federal state structure.
Bringing negotiations to Parliament
In response to the deadlock in the peace process, and in an attempt to deliver on 
its campaign promise before the November 2020 elections, the NLD-led 
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government changed its strategy to push for constitutional change in 2019. On 
29 January 2019, the ruling party established the Joint Parliamentary Committee 
for Constitutional Amendment (JPCCA). Composed of 45 members representing 
all parties in the Union Parliament on a proportional basis, including military 
lawmakers, the JPCCA was tasked with reviewing and proposing amendments to 
the Constitution.
The committee first invited its members to submit proposals for changes 
chapter by chapter. On 15 July 2019, the JPCCA submitted a report to 
Parliament compiling all 3,765 recommendations collected during the first phase 
(ConstitutionNet n.d.a). This inner-parliamentary process shed light on the 
competing demands and different priorities for reforms of the main groups in 
Parliament (International IDEA 2019; Kyaw 2019).
The NLD concentrated primarily on reducing the role of the military in 
politics. Most significantly, the ruling party sought to gradually reduce the 
proportion of military appointees in Parliament over the next three general 
elections, from the current maximum of 25 per cent to 5 per cent in 2030. 
Additionally, the NLD proposed to alter the existing constitutional amendment 
procedure by reducing the approval threshold from 75 per cent to two-thirds of 
members of the Union Parliament. With this change, the military would lose its 
ability to veto constitutional amendments. The ruling party aimed to further 
assert civilian control by proposing (i) the maintenance of civilian governance 
during states of emergency, (ii) civilian decision-making over the appointment of 
all ministers, and (iii) civilian control of the National Defence and Security 
Council. While proposing to significantly curtail the military’s role in politics, the 
ruling party did not envisage any significant changes to the current state structure 
or propose concrete options for the design of the future federal system.
The proposals put forth by the various ethnic political parties were the most far 
reaching. Ethnic parties broadly agreed on reducing the military’s involvement in 
politics. Most of them favoured removing all military members from the 
legislative branch and the Cabinet. In addition, ethnic political parties submitted 
detailed proposals related to the design of the federal system, with an emphasis on 
elements of self-rule. Although they differ in detail, ethnic parties generally 
proposed to redefine the sharing of legislative responsibilities by transferring 
many competencies from the federal level to the states and regions, or to a new 
list of concurrent powers. Some of them further recommended granting 
constituent units residual powers and the right to adopt substate constitutions. 
Most of them sought to enhance states’  and regions’  autonomy over their 
executive branch by proposing chief ministers to be elected by the constituent 
unit legislatures, rather than the current system of appointment by the president. 
The Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD)—the second-largest ethnic 
political party in the Union Parliament—is the only party that has also focused 
on elements of shared rule in detail, by submitting comprehensive proposals on 
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the system of representation at the union level. The SNLD proposed to radically 
strengthen the influence of non-Bamar‐majority states in the legislative process at 
the union level by (i) re-delineating the federal map around eight constituent 
units (consisting of one Bamar‐majority unit and seven non‐Bamar‐majority 
units), (ii) restructuring the upper house so that Bamar‐majority areas are 
represented by just one‐eighth of the total membership, while seven‐eighths are 
elected by the ethnic minority areas and (iii) by granting an absolute veto power 
to the upper house on all legislation. The party also favoured the representation of 
constituent units in the judiciary and in fourth-branch institutions at the union 
level, by proposing the Constitutional Tribunal and the Election Commission to 
consist of one member from each constituent unit. Therefore, with the exception 
of the SNLD, most of the ethnic parties focused on the design of the federal 
system by prioritizing elements of self-rule in an attempt to enhance the 
autonomy of the constituent units.
The military and the former ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party 
(USDP) objected to this constitutional review process from the outset on 
procedural grounds (Arkar and Latt 2019). Instead of presenting proposals within 
the committee, both groups submitted five separate amendment bills directly to 
the Union Parliament in 2019 (Aung 2019; ConstitutionNet n.d.b). Their 
proposals are narrow in scope. Like the ethnic political parties, the military and its 
proxy, the USDP, proposed that state and region legislatures be empowered to 
elect chief ministers. Both groups further recommended allowing chief ministers 
to define the number of ministries and to appoint ministers of their Cabinet. 
These proposals to enhance states’  and regions’  autonomy over their executive 
branch could be interpreted as a strategic approach by the military and the USDP 
to counterbalance the NLD’s dominance at the union level, rather than a genuine 
desire to move the federalization process forward. Similarly, by wishing to retain 
the overall structure of the constitution, the military expressed its desire to 
maintain its role in politics.
During the second phase of this inner-parliamentary process, the JPCCA 
prepared two constitutional amendment bills (ConstitutionNet n.d.c). As the 
voting procedure within the committee did not require consensus, the ruling 
party, with the support of small parties, was able to decide which proposals to 
retain (Zulueta-Fülscher 2020). Therefore, no real bargaining efforts took place 
within the committee. Only the proposals submitted by the NLD during the first 
phase were approved by the JPCCA and included in the final amendment bills 
(International IDEA 2020). None of the proposals submitted by ethnic political 
parties related to federalism were considered. Despite its critical importance to the 
peace process and the commitment provided in the NCA, the federalization 
process did not appear to be a priority for the NLD in 2019. The ruling party 
prioritized civilianization over federalism.
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The two amendment bills were submitted to the Union Parliament on 27 
January 2020 (Aung 2020). The vast majority of the 114 proposed amendments 
were eventually rejected. They failed to meet the parliamentary threshold, which 
requires any amendment proposal to be approved by more than 75 per cent of 
parliamentarians. Only four minor amendments were approved, none of which 
significantly changed the Constitution.
Demands for self-rule sidelined by competing agendas
The series of peace conferences (2015–2018) and the inner-parliamentary process 
launched in 2019 represented two consecutive opportunities to fulfil the NCA’s 
commitments to democracy and federalism. Yet no significant progress was made 
on the design of a future federal system.
Most of the discussions related to federalism have focused primarily on 
elements of self-rule, with the NLD willing to maintain a rather centralized 
system and ethnic minority groups advocating for greater autonomy for the 
constituent units. With the exception of the SNLD, the vast majority of 
stakeholders engaged in the constitutional reform debate have yet to formulate 
concrete proposals on the system of representation of constituent units in union- 
level institutions. This situation might be partly explained by the existence of a 
majority group and a dominant national political party in the country. Even if 
institutional arrangements were established to ensure the representation of 
constituent units at the union level, ethnic minority groups fear that they might 
still have a limited influence over federal policymaking, and therefore focus most 
of their demands on enhanced self-rule.
Nevertheless, ethnic political parties could have some leverage on decision- 
making at the union level, even within the current constitutional framework. If 
ethnic minority parties could secure 25 per cent of the seats in the Union 
Parliament through a united coalition, the NLD or the military/USDP would 
need its support to elect their presidential candidate in the legislature; the ethnic 
coalition could leverage this bargaining position to demand concessions in return.
The NLD’s change in strategy in 2019 exposed the competing demands and 
priorities of the main groups in Parliament in the run-up to the 2020 general 
elections. While the ruling party prioritized the civilianization of the 
Constitution, ethnic parties pushed for a decentralized federal system. The 
military and the USDP tried to take advantage of this divide to maintain the 
status quo (Kyaw 2019). Although they all agreed to federalism in the NCA, these 
three political groupings demonstrated different levels of commitment to moving 
the federalization process forward.
Even though the road towards federalism in Myanmar remains very uncertain, 
the constitutional review process initiated by the NLD in 2019 was not fruitless. 
Most significantly, this inner-parliamentary process allowed the different political 
forces represented in the legislature to officially present their proposals for 
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constitutional reform. Ethnic political parties took this opportunity to suggest 
provisions that detail the type of federal system they envision for the country. 
These proposals could serve as a basis for future constitutional negotiations and 
could inform future peace conferences to be held under the new government in 
2021. To materialize the federal promise provided in the NCA, however, peace 
stakeholders in Myanmar must seriously engage in comprehensive and in-depth 
negotiations on options to set up elements of both self-rule and shared rule. Such 
an approach could potentially ease trade-offs between the main stakeholders on 
core features of the future state structure.
Negotiations on federal design in South Sudan
From unanswered demands for a Sudanese federation towards federalism in an 
independent South Sudan
Demands for a federal state structure in South Sudan date back to before 
independence. When debating the future of the larger Sudan in 1954, delegates 
from the South requested to establish a federation after independence from the 
British, in which the North and South would be granted equal status and some 
level of autonomy (Johnson 2014; Mo 2014). This demand was not considered, 
and a unitary state structure was established at independence in 1956. The 
disagreement between the South and North culminated in two civil wars (1955– 
1972 and 1983–2005). The second civil war ended in 2005 with the signature of 
a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which established autonomy arrangements 
and granted the South the right to hold a referendum on secession after six years 
(UNMIS 2005).
The people of South Sudan voted to secede from Sudan in 2011. After 
independence, demands for federalism once again emerged during the drafting of 
the Transitional Constitution (Johnson 2014; Aalen and Schomerus 2016). 
Representatives from the Equatoria region made substantive calls for a federal 
arrangement, fearing that a centralized and unitary state structure would 
marginalize the minority groups settled in the region. The transitional charter 
adopted by South Sudan’s Parliament in July 2011 provides for the drafting of a 
permanent constitution, and establishes a decentralized, quasi-federal state 
structure for the transition period. The Transitional Constitution divides 
executive and legislative responsibilities between the national and state levels. 
States are granted significant legislative competencies and have autonomy over 
their executive branch as their chief executives (governors) are elected by state 
citizens. States are also represented at the national level through the upper house 
of Parliament, the members of which are elected by state legislatures.
Demands for federalism regained traction in 2013 when a civil war erupted 
along ethnic lines following President Salva Kiir’s dismissal of Vice-President Riek 
Machar. The ruling Sudan People’s  Liberation Movement (SPLM) split, as 
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Machar and his supporters formed the SPLM-In-Opposition (SPLM-IO). The 
insurgency and demands for federalism resulted from the centralization of power 
by the ruling SPLM. In addition, President Kiir exercised a constitutional 
provision allowing him to remove state governors and appoint new state chief 
executives in the event of a crisis (article 101.r of the 2011 Transitional 
Constitution). While this provision requires new elections to be held in the 
concerned state within 60 days, in most cases they were not. This allowed the 
national government to curb opposition at the state level and undermine 
decentralization. The SPLM-IO requested a federal solution to the conflict, 
arguing that it would remedy the centralization of power, the exclusion of some 
groups from the public administration and their marginalization in politics. 
Despite mediation efforts led by the international community and a peace 
agreement in 2015, the armed conflict between the two warring leaders only 
ended in September 2018 with the signature of a revitalized peace agreement (R- 
ARCSS) (UNMIS 2015; Intergovernmental Authority on Development 2018). 
The R-ARCSS stipulates a pre-transition period of eight months leading to the 
formation of a new government of national unity. This government of national 
unity will govern during a three-year transitional period, which will culminate in 
the adoption of a permanent constitution that will establish a federal system.
Initial discussions on federal design during the pre-transition period
In 2019, the pre-transition institutions focused on negotiating and implementing 
critical prerequisites for the transition period. Parties to the conflict had to find a 
compromise on the composition of a coalition government, the integration of the 
armed forces, the review of key legislations and the incorporation of the 
revitalized peace agreement in the 2011 Transitional Constitution.
Although the negotiations over a permanent federal constitution are scheduled 
to take place during the transition period, a few pre-transition institutions were 
tasked with negotiating key elements of the federal structure that were central to 
the conflict. The Independent Boundaries Commission was responsible for 
brokering a compromise on the number and the delineation of constituent units, 
as well as the restructuring of the upper house of the federal parliament. These 
two issues were of particular importance as they would determine the degree of 
representation and influence each warring party will enjoy under the government 
of national unity during the three-year transition period (International Crisis 
Group 2019b).
The controversy over the number of states sparked in 2015, when President 
Kiir unilaterally increased the number of states from 10 to 32 in order to favour 
his political base, the Dinka community, and to curb the increasing territorial 
control of the SPLM-IO over the Great Upper Nile region (International Crisis 
Group 2019a). The SPLM-IO objected to this new delineation from the outset. 
The opposition party first favoured the establishment of 21 states, before calling 
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for a return to the original 10 states that South Sudan had at its independence in 
2011. Despite several months of protracted negotiations, the Independent 
Boundaries Commission failed to propose a federal map on which all warring 
parties could agree upon.
Due to the slow progress made on substantial matters, including on the 
delineation of the federal map, the pre-transition period was extended twice in 
2019. A transitional government of national unity was only formed on 22 
February 2020, after the president announced a return to the original 10 states 
plus 3 new administrative areas. During the three-year transition period to come, 
stakeholders will have to agree on a permanent constitution and the design of the 
federal state structure.
What’s next? Materializing the demands for self-rule and shared rule in a 
permanent federal constitution
As the constitution-making process unfolds, discussions on the future federal 
scheme are likely to focus on elements of both self-rule and shared rule. During 
the negotiations on the R-ARCSS, opposition groups advocated granting more 
autonomy to the states in order to enhance the influence of constituent units in 
national-level decision-making, and to make national institutions, such as the 
public administration and security forces, more inclusive of the country’s diverse 
communities. The R-ARCSS reflects these demands for both self-rule and shared 
rule. In addition to prescribing that the future federal constitution shall devolve 
more responsibilities and resources to the states (self-rule), the revitalized 
agreement also includes a commitment to reorganize the military, to restructure 
the upper house of the federal parliament, and to establish a Fiscal and Financial 
Allocation Monitoring Commission (FFAMC). The upper house of parliament 
and FFAMC are two institutions through which constituent units would be able 
to participate in decision-making at the federal level (shared rule).
Calls for federalism in South Sudan encompass demands for both self-rule and 
shared rule. This fact may be explained, in part, by the country’s social, partisan 
and economic configuration. South Sudan contains approximately 60 different 
ethnic groups, none of which constitutes a majority. If politics continue to be 
structured around ethnic lines, several political groups might have a chance to 
counterbalance or reduce the dominance of the ruling SPLM at the federal level 
by forming a coalition in opposition. Perhaps most significantly, South Sudan’s 
economy largely relies on extractive industries located in the northern part of the 
country. Each year, the government derives 70 to 90 per cent of its budget from 
oil revenues (Cordaid 2014; Reed 2020). Most of the states do not have a 
sufficient tax base, and therefore rely on the redistribution of public funds from 
the central level to function and deliver public services. In this context, 
constituent units have a strong interest in defining institutional arrangements that 
would guarantee them a say over the allocation of public funds, and on wider 
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policymaking decisions at the federal level. Having access to power at the federal 
level would entail access to the public funds necessary to implement federal- and 
state-level policies. Similarly, a key aspect of the federalization process in South 
Sudan is opposition groups’  demands to restructure the public administration, 
including the armed and security forces, to make these institutions more inclusive 
of the country’s diverse communities. Given the underdevelopment of the private 
sector, such an overhaul is a central demand driving the debate over federalism as 
it would provide employment opportunities and a source of income to different 
ethnic groups in the context of a post-civil-war economy.
Concluding remarks
The cases of Myanmar and South Sudan illustrate that, while warring parties may 
agree on the pertinence of federalism at an early stage of a political settlement, 
negotiating the design of the future federal system remains a challenging task. 
This is because the term ‘federalism’  says little about the institutional details 
involved. To materialize a commitment to federalism, stakeholders have to agree 
on the number and delineation of constituent units, their level of autonomy (self- 
rule) and the extent to which these constituent units can influence federal 
policymaking (shared rule).
In Myanmar, the negotiations on federalism have mostly centred on self-rule. 
The demands for enhanced constituent unit autonomy put forth by ethnic 
political parties have been sidelined by the ruling NLD party, which has 
prioritized civilianization over federalism. The focus on self-rule is rooted in 
history. Before colonial rule, some of the ethnic states were sovereign separate 
entities that had their own governance system and control over their political 
affairs. After independence, the successive centralized state structures did not 
provide incentives for ethnic minorities to ‘buy  in’  to union-level institutions. 
The lack of consideration of elements of shared rule might also be partly 
explained by the presence of a majority group and a dominant national political 
party. Minority parties have focused their demands on self-rule due to fears that 
they might not be able to meaningfully influence decision-making at the federal 
level.
In South Sudan, demands for federalism have instead encompassed elements of 
both self-rule and shared rule. Taken together, the concentration of financial 
resources at the national level of government, the lack of sufficiently broad 
revenue sources at the constituent unit level, and the absence of a natural majority 
group in the country might, to a certain extent, explain why several stakeholders 
have an interest in defining institutional arrangements that would guarantee 
constituent units significant influence over decision-making at the federal level.
As the negotiations in the two countries evolve, competing perspectives on the 
set-up of the federal scheme are likely to emerge. More in-depth and 
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comprehensive negotiations that cover elements of both self-rule and shared rule 
might facilitate cross-issue bargaining and compromise, thus providing key 
stakeholders an opportunity to give a concrete meaning to their commitment to 
federalism.
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6. Making and re-making internal 
boundaries: debates on the ‘federal map’ 




Federalism can be thought of as a country’s constitutionalized spatial arrangement 
of public power. One of its core features is that it allows self-governance over a list 
of constitutionally prescribed responsibilities for a community within a specified 
geographical space. Therefore there is perhaps no alteration to a federal scheme 
more significant than changing the boundaries which delineate that space.
The number and boundaries of states—referred to here as the ‘federal map’—is 
often a contentious issue during transitions from a unitary to a federal system, for 
example in recent constitution-building processes in Nepal, Somalia and Yemen. 
This chapter focuses on how these debates arose and unfolded in 2019 in two 
very different settings—South Sudan and India. The number and boundaries of 
states is contentious for different reasons. In some contexts, the delineation of a 
constituent unit enables a territorially concentrated community to form a political 
majority and therefore exercise a degree of self-governance. This is the most 
common driver of state creation. It was, for example, a critical issue for the 
Madhesi community during Nepal’s constitution-building process, and in South 
Africa for the white-dominated National Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party.
Another consequence of decisions on the number of states is each state’s ability 
to influence central decision-making. For example, one consequence of the 
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expansion of the number of states in Nigeria over time from 3 to 36 has been an 
increase in the power of the federal government vis-à-vis state governments. 
Sometimes this may become contentious due to ethnic demographics. For 
example, Myanmar is divided into 14 constituent units—seven ethnic states and 
seven regions that have an ethnic Bamar majority. In constitutional amendment 
proposals in 2019, some ethnic political parties proposed redrawing the federal 
map to create eight constituent units by combining the seven Bamar-majority 
regions into one unit. In their view, this would honour a promise made during 
the country’s  founding in 1947 regarding equality of representation among its 
ethnic groups. This was also an issue in the early development of the United 
States: states were admitted to the union in such a way as to balance the 
representation of slave-owning and free states in the Senate.
Lastly, the contours of the federal map may affect access to natural resources. 
For example, Yemen’s  civil war was partly triggered by contention over the 
proposed federal map, particularly access to the sea for the Azal region, where the 
Houthi movement was based (Shuja Al-Deen 2019).
Underlying these issues of access to public power and resources are three 
additional considerations. First, boundaries can raise long-standing claims to an 
ethnic ‘homeland’, which can drive mass mobilization and trigger violent conflict. 
Such contexts are also often used to mobilize the base for nationalist parties at the 
centre. The Sri Lankan Civil War of 1983–2009 and the accompanying politics 
of Tamil and Sinhala nationalists is a stark example, but one of many worldwide.
Second, at the local level, boundaries can have significant effects on the daily 
lives of communities. For instance, the challenges faced by local communities in 
the Central Border Region of Ireland/Northern Ireland due to Brexit were 
likened to ‘opening  a wound’  risking political polarization, significant negative 
consequences for local businesses and an increased sense of marginalization 
(Hayward 2017).
Third, particularly in contexts of elite patronage politics, the process to 
delineate states can be a forum for contestation of resources among elites at the 
centre, as rival groups seek to draw the federal map in a way which will favour 
their own patronage networks.
Each of these factors can result in losers as well as winners. The creation of a 
state for one community may generate a new minority within that state that now 
feels at risk of marginalization (e.g. see Bisarya 2020). Likewise, more seats in 
central institutions (or more access to natural resources) for one state means fewer 
for others.
Contexts and criteria
Negotiations over the number and boundaries of constituent units can arise in 
various contexts (Anderson 2014). While the issue most obviously arises in the 
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context of unitary to federal transition (e.g. Nepal, South Africa), there are also 
cases where transitions to federalism occur before the federal map is drawn (e.g. 
Somalia), and many cases where the federal map is redrawn over time as unsettled 
issues become untenable under the existing arrangements (e.g. India, Nigeria).
Two cases are discussed in detail below: India, which redrew its federal map 
with regard to one specific state, and South Sudan, for which the entire federal 
map was under negotiation.
The criteria that decide boundary delineation (or that drive political 
negotiations) include economic/capacity considerations, historical considerations, 
socio-cultural issues and political geometry (Anderson 2014). These criteria recur 
in several different frameworks for boundary delineation, ranging from the India 
State Reorganization Commission of 1956 to the Somalia Provisional 
Constitution of 2012. Notably, the resolution establishing the 1956 State 
Reorganization Commission put forward as the ‘first essential consideration’ the 
‘preservation and strengthening of the unity and security of India’.
While these criteria played some role in the process, or at least the rhetoric, of 




At its independence in July 2011, South Sudan maintained its existing 10-state 
structure. However, after the breakout of conflict in 2013, this became a critical 
issue of contention as different parties sought to change the number and 
boundaries of states to suit them and their networks. Under a peace agreement 
signed in 2018, different institutions and mechanisms were established in 2019 to 
resolve the issue of the federal map, but they were unable to reach a consensus. In 
early 2020, the parties ultimately agreed to return to the 10-state structure, with 
three administrative areas.
Historical background
The delineation of internal boundaries in South Sudan has a long history. It can 
principally be traced to the evolution of provincial boundary demarcation under 
Sudan’s Anglo-Egyptian administration from the start until the middle of the 
20th century (Johnson 2010). Provincial boundaries were frequently made and 
remade during this time, often as part of a conflict management strategy to bring 
rival groups together (Johnson 2010: 21). As well as being fluid over time, the 
borders that were put in place were ‘flexible to the point of invisibility’ (Johnson 
2010: 21), as levels of provincial authority waxed and waned, and the nature of 
some of the pastoral communities meant that territorial jurisdiction was never 
complete. Transfers of districts between provinces was common, brokered 
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between local leaders and then ratified by the central authority in Khartoum, as 
was the relocation of communities from one part of the country to another.
This porous and inconstant provincial boundary landscape was codified at 
independence on 1 January 1956. This date has become a touchstone for 
subsequent peace negotiations over boundaries. It was referred to in the 1972 
Addis Ababa Agreement that ended the first Sudanese Civil War, the 2005 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement at the end of the second civil war, and—as 
discussed below—in the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the 
Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) signed at the end of the 
most recent violent conflict. However, and importantly with regards to the 
current process, there is no single authoritative source that shows the provincial 
boundaries as of that date. Regardless of the precise boundaries, present-day 
South Sudan comprised three large provinces at independence—Bahr El Ghazal 
to the West, Equatoria to the South and Upper Nile to the North.
Over time, with the industrialization of agriculture and the discovery of oil and 
other natural resources, control over fixed territories became an increasingly 
important issue for those contesting political power, and a central driver for the 
two civil wars. In 1994, a new federal constitution was promulgated which 
divided the South into 10 states. This process was both arbitrary and largely 
theoretical, as most of the territory in the South was out of the control of 
government forces (Johnson 2014).
As part of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement which ended the second 
Sudanese Civil War, the southern part of the country received increased 
autonomy for an interim period, which included an interim constitution that 
reaffirmed the existing 10-state structure (Interim Constitution of Southern 
Sudan, section 1(2)).
The agreement also provided for an independence referendum on 9 January 
2011, in which an overwhelming 99 per cent of people in the South voted for 
secession. The Republic of South Sudan came into being on 9 July 2011, along 
with a Transitional Constitution that restated the 10-state structure (Transitional 
Constitution of South Sudan, section 162.1).
The vote for independence highlighted a public united behind the idea of an 
independent South Sudan, but long-standing divisions soon surfaced among 
political elites. In December 2013 violent clashes broke out in an army barracks 
on the outskirts of the capital city, Juba. In the following days, leaders thought to 
be loyal to Vice-President Riek Machar were rounded up and jailed. Machar 
himself escaped Juba to begin an armed rebel resistance. President Salva Kiir 
accused Machar of seeking to instigate a coup, while Machar accused President 
Kiir of fabricating the attempted coup in order to eliminate potential rivals. Over 
the next five years, fighting continued across South Sudan as regional leaders 
defected from one side to the other. In particular, cities in the Greater Nile region 
continue to suffer from violent conflict.
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After the failure of initial peace talks in 2015, the peace agreement was 
resurrected and signed in Addis Ababa in September 2018. The R-ARCSS 
includes a process—launched in 2019—to reach a consensus on the federal map.
Post-independence changes to the federal map
While the parties to the conflict were numerous and fluid over time, the two 
major parties were the Sudan People’s  Liberation Movement-in Government 
(SPLM-IG) forces, under President Kiir, and the Sudan People’s  Liberation 
Movement-in Opposition (SPLM-IO) forces, under current First Vice President 
Riek Machar. The roots of this conflict go back at least two decades and are 
highly complex (see Johnson 2012 for a detailed account). It is important to note 
that while both leaders come from different ethnic groups (Dinka and Nuer, 
respectively), and have power bases located in different regions (Bahr El Ghazal 
and Upper Nile, respectively), the conflict can only partly be explained in ethno- 
territorial terms. The political ambitions of the two leaders and their immediate 
circles of elites, coupled with different visions for the SPLM and the country, 
underlie and predate the ethnic dimensions of the conflict. Accommodating these 
ambitions is a central factor in the redrawing of the federal map and the 
overarching peace process (Schneider 2013).
In mid-2014, the SPLM-IO proposed to divide the 10 existing states into 21 
states, along the lines of the district boundaries in place at independence (Radio 
Tamuzuj 2014). In response, President Kiir in October 2015 announced his plan 
to dissolve the 10 states and create a new federal map with 28 states; he also 
amended the Constitution to this effect. In January 2017 he increased this 
number via presidential decree to 32 states. Interpretations of the motives behind 
these initiatives vary, but most commentators agree that both sides sought to 
create a federal map that would strengthen and/or maintain their patronage 
networks and military circles by creating more positions of power within their 
territorial areas of influence, gerrymandering borders to shape states around local 
majorities and ensuring that oilfields lay within areas controlled by loyalists (de 
Waal and Pendle 2019; Stimson Center 2016).
The R-ARCSS process
The R-ARCSS, signed in September 2018, sought to end the five-year conflict. 
Its central features include a power-sharing transitional government; a complex 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process; and a process to 
write a new ‘permanent’  federal constitution. The process is divided into two 
phases. The first centres on DDR and the return of Riek Machar and his 
followers to Juba to take their place in the Transitional Government of National 
Unity. The second consists of a period of transitional governance through a series 
of power-sharing institutions at the federal and state levels. These are tasked with 
overseeing a range of reform processes, including constitutional reform. Notably, 
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the parties sought to include negotiations on the federal map in the first ‘pre- 
transitional’  phase, before constitutional reform negotiations have even begun. 
This prioritization of the boundary talks emphasizes the centrality of this issue in 
the overall peace process.
In order to forge a new federal map, the R-ARCSS calls for the establishment 
of two bodies—(1) a Tribal Boundaries Committee (TBC) composed of 
international experts and (2) an Independent Boundaries Commission (IBC) 
comprised of both South Sudanese and internationals. The TBC was to conduct 
consultations and gather data to ‘define and demarcate the tribal areas of South 
Sudan as they stood on 1 January 1956, and the tribal areas in dispute in the 
country’ (R-ARCSS, 1.15.18.1). This was interpreted as concerning only 
boundaries that were in dispute as a consequence of the move to 32 states 
(RJMEC 2019: 9). The IBC’s mandate was to make recommendations on the 
number and boundaries of states, as well as on the Council of States (upper house 
of the national legislature). If the IBC was unable to deliver a report, the R- 
ARCSS called for the issue to be decided by referendum.
The TBC was established on 9 January 2019. It produced maps of the 32-state 
structure as well as maps showing the boundaries under dispute. But it was unable 
to complete the actual demarcation, citing a lack of time and resources, and 
instead provided recommendations for how the government could complete the 
task in the future (RJMEC 2019).
The IBC was established on 28 February 2019 and began meeting in March. It 
submitted its final report in July 2019. Six of the South Sudanese members, as 
well as the four international members, supported reverting to the 10-state 
structure. The other four South Sudanese members voted for 32-plus states. As 
the rules of procedure required that seven South Sudanese members had to agree 
in order to make a determination, the final report could not contain a conclusive 
recommendation. However, the report recommended resolving the issue through 
political dialogue among the parties and not through a referendum.
Political dialogue continued sporadically throughout the second half of 2019, 
mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the 
deputy president of South Africa, David Mabuza. As the year ended, agreement 
on the number and boundaries of states was the primary issue preventing progress 
on implementation of the peace agreement and the formation of the transitional 
government. Eventually, deadlock was broken in February 2020 following 
mediation by the president of Uganda and the prime minister of Sudan. This 
came with the announcement of an agreement to return to the 10-state structure, 
but with three ‘carved-out’ areas that would be under the administration of the 
federal government. These were Abyei, an oil-rich region on the Sudan/South 
Sudan border which has had special administrative status since 2004 and has long 
been the site of contention between the two countries; Ruweng, another oil-rich 
region primarily populated by Dinka within the Nuer-majority state of Unity; 
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and Pibor, a long-marginalized area in Jonglei state which had received special 
administrative status, almost akin to another state, following a peace deal signed 
between the president and local rebel leader David Yau Yau in 2014. The stability 
of this latest formula for the state structure of South Sudan remains uncertain.
India—Jammu and Kashmir
Overview
There are many asymmetries within India’s  federal structure—particularly with 
regards to Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Located on the border with Pakistan and 
home to a majority Muslim population, it received a negotiated special status at 
independence that limited the national parliament’s powers within the state. This 
special status has long been contested, often violently, and has never been far 
from the main agenda in national political debates.
In August 2019, the Union government undertook a series of legal measures 
that abrogated the special status of J&K and divided it into two Union 
Territories. These actions have been challenged as unconstitutional. At the time 
of writing, the Supreme Court has yet to decide the case.
Historical background and the origins and contents of article 370
The area known as Jammu and Kashmir consists of three regions: Jammu, which 
has a Hindu majority; the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley; and Ladakh, 
dominated by Muslim and Buddhist populations. The state as it was at 
independence, and until August 2019, came into being through the 1846 Treaty 
of Amritsar in which the Hindu ruler (Raja) of Jammu and Ladakh added the 
Kashmir Valley to his jurisdiction by purchasing it from the East India Company.
Throughout the first half of the 20th century, as British colonial rule of India 
gradually weakened and the independence movement grew, tensions continued to 
rise between the Hindu and Muslim populations in J&K. National-level 
discussions between leaders of the Congress Party and the Muslim League about 
Muslims’  place in the political framework of newly independent India broke 
down; the Muslim League withdrew from the Constituent Assembly and 
announced Pakistan’s  secession from India. Princely states, of which there were 
565 including J&K, were given a choice to accede to Pakistan or to India or 
declare independence.
Concurrently, tensions within J&K peaked with the imprisonment of the 
(Muslim) opposition leader, the declaration of martial law by the Maharaja and 
armed incursions across the border from Pakistan. The Maharaja requested 
military help from India, but such assistance was predicated on J&K’s accession 
to India, which in turn was conditional on an eventual referendum for the people 
of J&K to decide their future. No referendum was ever held, partly because— 
despite Prime Minister Nehru’s conviction to the contrary—the Government of 
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India was anxious that the people might choose accession to Pakistan 
(Chandrachud forthcoming).
At the same time, the Constitution of India needed to be completed, but with 
the status of J&K in limbo it was unclear how it might fit in—or not—to the 
final constitutional framework. The solution was to draft a temporary provision, 
later to become article 370, to govern the relationship between India and J&K in 
the interim. The article had several components that limited the reach of both the 
Constitution and the legislative power of the Union Parliament into the affairs of 
J&K. The temporal nature of this article is embodied in 370(3), which states that 
the president can amend article 370 or declare that it ceases to be operative, but 
only on the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly.
The J&K Constituent Assembly was convened in 1951 and promulgated a 
constitution of Jammu and Kashmir—which committed J&K as an integral part 
of India—in 1956. The Constituent Assembly was permanently dissolved on 26 
January 1956 without making any recommendation to the president on the 
abrogation or otherwise of article 370. Therefore, article 370 continued to be a 
part of the Constitution until 2019.
August 2019: a constitutional conundrum and the reshaping of Jammu and 
Kashmir
In 2019, the government faced a constitutional conundrum. It wished to change 
the status of J&K, and to reshape the federal map around it. But in order to do 
so, article 370 of the Constitution required the consent of the J&K Constituent 
Assembly—which no longer exists. The government’s solution to this puzzle was 
as follows.
In December 2018, the president of India issued a proclamation under article 
356 of the Constitution to put J&K under President’s Rule for the first time in 
22 years. President’s Rule puts governance of the state under the power of the 
president and union legislature. The grounds for President’s  Rule have their 
origins in the withdrawal of confidence in the J&K government by 25 MPs from 
the ruling national party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).
On 5 August 2019, the president issued an order ‘with the State government’s 
concurrence’—meaning, under President’s  Rule, the governor, who is a 
representative of the central government—with several consequences for the 
status of J&K (Gazette of India, Presidential Order C.O. 272 of 2019). 
Importantly, the order amended article 367, which pertains to the interpretation 
of certain terms in the constitutional text. Specifically, it stated that reference to a 
‘constituent assembly’ should now be read as referring to the ‘legislative assembly’. 
This removed the problem of relying on the recommendation of a non-existent 
body to amend/abrogate article 370.
President’s  Rule allowed the recommendation of the Union Parliament to 
substitute for that of the J&K legislative assembly regarding decisions on the 
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status of article 370. The Union Parliament duly passed a resolution on 5 August 
recommending to the president that article 370 cease to be operative.
With the special protections of article 370 now removed, on 9 August 2019 the 
Union Parliament passed the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, which 
converted the state into two union territories: Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh.
Constitutional challenges
Given the heated debates that have surrounded the status of J&K since the 
agreement on accession, and the elaborate and convoluted constitutional pathway 
required, it is not surprising that the government’s  actions of August 2019 
generated debate and opposition regarding the constitutionality of the procedure 
used. The key challenges can be summarized as follows.
First, the government cannot amend article 367 by presidential order. Article 
370(1) provided that modifications can be made to the application of the 
constitution to J&K by presidential order, and this mechanism was indeed used 
several times over the past 70 years to erode J&K’s  special status. However, as 
stated above, article 370 cannot be amended except on the recommendation of 
the constituent assembly. The government argues that modifying article 367 falls 
under article 370(1) as it is not directly an amendment to article 370. This 
argument is bolstered by a 1972 Supreme Court precedent that allowed the word 
‘governor’  to replace ‘Sadar-i-Riyasat’ once the latter office was replaced by the 
former through an amendment to the J&K Constitution.
There are two main objections to this argument. First, the 1972 case was 
clarificatory in nature (Bhatia 2019). Yet, the 2019 amendment to article 367 
substantially changes the operation of article 370. Therefore, the government has 
sought to do indirectly what it cannot do directly, and this constitutes an 
unconstitutional action (Bhatia 2019). Second, the 1972 case concerned 
recognition in the constitution of a change that had already been affected by the 
constituent power of J&K through an amendment to the state constitution. No 
such action could be said to have preceded the August 2019 presidential order.
A second argument concerns the substituting authority for the consent of the 
Constituent Assembly. This argument has three facets. First, can a legislative 
assembly substitute for a constituent assembly? The former is a constituted power, 
and the latter is a constituent power; the Indian Supreme Court has long held 
that there is an important distinction between the two (Khosla 2019). Second, 
consent was not even given by the legislative assembly of J&K, but by the 
governor. Yet the governor is an agent of the central government, and therefore 
the central government has obtained its own consent, not that of the state (Bhatia 
2019). Third, all of this was done under President’s  Rule—a temporary 
arrangement designed to return to a state of normalcy. It could be considered 
questionable to permanently alter the federal map, dividing a state into two parts 
and converting them to union territories, during a period in which neither the 
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people nor state representatives have a mechanism through which they can be 
consulted.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of India will decide on the constitutionality of 
the division of the state of Jammu and Kashmir into two union territories. On the 
one hand, the government seems to have been constrained by a constitutional 
impossibility left in place after the Constituent Assembly of J&K dissolved 
without making a recommendation on article 370. This gave what was meant to 
be a temporary article permanent status. On the other hand, regardless of the 
challenges associated with complying with the letter of the law, the modality of 
dismembering Jammu and Kashmir seems to go against the spirit of article 370.
Concluding remarks
The 2019 cases of redrawing the ‘federal map’  in South Sudan and India took 
place in very different contexts. The former occurred in the shadow of 
independence and emerging from peace negotiations to end a civil war; the latter 
came after seven decades of instability and contention regarding the status of 
J&K. However, in both cases the changes to the federal map were driven by 
decisions taken by the central government, with no real consultations with the 
affected populations. The long-term effects of these centre-driven dynamics are 
uncertain for both states, but comparative history indicates that such an approach 
rarely brings long-term stability.
While the flexibility of India’s  federal map has been a hallmark of India’s 
ability to respond to linguistic diversity and internal conflict, the evolution of 
events in South Sudan and India in 2019, with unilateral decisions to adjust the 
federal map purely in response to national political considerations, raise questions 
about whether such systems can really be considered federal.
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